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ABSTRACT
There are always painful tradeo↵s in environmental problems. In the current period,
the tradeo↵ has to be made between consuming environmental goods and “dirty” goods.
Since many pollutants accumulate in nature and cause long time problems, the current
period’s decision also has important impacts on future generations. This yields another
tradeo↵ between control of the pollution flow and cleanup of the pollution stock in the
future. For a local government, tradeo↵s between strict environmental policies and local
economic prosperity are also concerns.
This thesis analyzes the tradeo↵s made by households, firms and government under dif-
ferent policy regimes. Chapter 2 considers assigning tradable permits to households that
are su↵ering from pollution generated by firms. The households can sell a limited num-
ber of permits to polluters according to personal preferences for environmental goods and
“dirty” goods. It is shown that, the market transaction between households and polluters can
achieve the e cient pollution level. Chapter 3 considers a case in which the stock pollution
is reversible with capital investment. In a natural resource extraction model with exter-
nalities of heavy metal pollution in the surrounding farmland, the firm’s tradeo↵ between
controlling the pollution flow and abating the pollution stock, as well as the firm’s extrac-
tion decisions are analyzed. Chapter 4 derives the optimal environmental bond required by
a local government as a financial assurance for inducing firms to do pollution abatement.
A local government needs to make tradeo↵s between charging a large amount of bond and
encouraging local economic prosperity. For a local government, the optimal bond amount
does not necessarily cover the worst-case scenario. This thesis contributes to environmental
policy design by considering the interests of di↵erent parties.
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Environmental problem has been a worldwide concern for a long time. Generally, there
are painful tradeo↵s. On the one hand, people really enjoy the gifts of nature and try to
protect the environment; on the other hand, they also want the conveniences of life that
come from consuming “dirty” goods. Furthermore, the current period tradeo↵ between
environmental goods and “dirty” goods has important impacts on future generations, since
many pollutants accumulate in nature and cause long time problems. For example, part
of the global CO2 stock is generated by previous economic activities. In this thesis, the
stocked pollutants that can be eliminated by capital investment are referred to as reversible
stock pollutants. This yields another tradeo↵ between control of the pollution flow now
versus cleanup of the pollution stock at proper times in the future. To ensure the financial
resources for future reclamation, the environmental bonding requirement has been used in
mineral and energy extraction activities. For a local government, tradeo↵s between strict
environmental policies and local economic prosperity are also concerns.
This thesis considers who are the right persons and how they would make decisions under
di↵erent circumstances. Most of the time, social planners design environmental policies for
polluters, including emission taxes, tradable permits, and subsidies. However, under some
circumstances, residents may own more information about the value of environmental goods
than any other agents. They may be the right persons to make tradeo↵s between consuming
environmental goods and “dirty” goods. For reversible stock pollution, polluters may be at
the right position to make tradeo↵s between control of the pollution flow and cleanup of
the pollution stock in the future. To induce polluters to do cleanup while not discouraging
the local economic development, the government may consider an optimal environmental
bond amount. This thesis asks the following questions: Can assignment of tradable permits
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to households yield an e cient outcome? Given a reversible stock pollutant, how should
e↵orts be allocated between control of the flow of pollutants versus cleanup of the stock of
pollutants, and how does this a↵ect extraction decisions? What is the optimal bond amount
for environmental cleanup; should it equal the worst-case scenario?
Chapter 2 considers that the households, instead of social planners, may be at the right
position to make decisions on environmental problems under some circumstances. The as-
signment of tradable permits - representing property rights of environmental goods - to
households that are su↵ering from pollution generated by firms is considered. These house-
holds are referred to as victims or consumers since they also consume “dirty” goods produced
by firms. The consumers are assigned the whole property rights of environmental goods and
they can sell a limited amount of permits to polluters according to personal preferences.
For a special case with a sole consumer, market transactions between the consumer and
polluters achieve an e cient pollution level. However, for a group of consumers, the decen-
tralized market solution fails to yield social e ciency because of competitive consumption
of the environmental goods. This thesis extends the concept of unitization and designs a
sharing-benefit mechanism, under which market transactions also achieve e cient resource
allocation, even when the consumers’ preferences are unknown. Assigning tradable permits
to households is useful under uncertain social cost and provides a method to reveal monetary
values of environmental goods.
Chapter 3 concerns the stock pollution problem, for example, the pollution of heavy
metals stocked in soil in developing countries due to industrialization. Unlike the existing
literature, this thesis considers the pollution stock to be reversible with capital investment.
A natural resource extraction model with externalities of heavy metal pollution in the sur-
rounding farmland is used. Three policy regimes are designed: (1) the mining firm is required
to pay both the current period pollution damage and future land recovery cost; (2) the firm
has to pay the pollution damage during the extraction period; (3) the firm is responsible for
polluted land recovery after the extraction activity. Under these policies, the mining firm
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will invest in the control of the pollution flow at each period to contain the pollutant in
certain areas, considering the pollution damage and/or future recovery cost. Specifically, if
the marginal cost of pollution control is higher than the externality costs (equal the pollu-
tion damage plus the recovery cost), more acres of farmland will be polluted. Otherwise,
the pollution is contained in a fixed area. Compared with the extraction path under no
regulations, the firm will exhaust the mine (either economically or physically) in a shorter
period of time under environmental liabilities. As such, the life of the mine is shorter un-
der the environmental policies. The data simulation is used to show how the pollution and
extraction paths change under various regulations.
Chapter 4 discusses the bonding requirement as a financial assurance for inducing firms
to do pollution cleanups. Even though a bond has the advantage of being able to cover future
uncertain risks in environmental problems, the bond amount is not easy to determine. This
study derives the optimal environmental bond based on the concern of a revenue-maximizing
local government. It is shown that for a local government, it is not necessarily unreasonable to
require a smaller bond amount than the real reclamation cost. Large bonds may discourage
local economic activities, thus diminishing the government’s royalty income. This thesis
recommends that the bond amount be set as a percentage of the firm’s revenue. The optimal
bond rate is correlated with the firm entrance (the number of firms that operates in an
administrative region) and duty shirking (failing to do cleanups) elasticities with respect to
the bond rate. With a relatively low elasticity of firm entrance and a high elasticity of duty
shirking, the bond can be charged at a large amount. However, a relatively high elasticity
of firm entrance would require the bond to be charged at a small amount, even smaller than
the real reclamation cost for maximizing the local government’s royalty revenue. Therefore,
the optimal bond amount does not necessarily cover the worst-case scenario.
This thesis contributes to environmental policy design by considering the interests of dif-
ferent parties. By assigning tradable permits to households that are su↵ering from pollution
generated by firms under a sharing-benefit mechanism, this thesis provides the first step for
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designing a policy of community-based tradable permits. Considering both the current and
future e↵ects of pollution, this thesis contributes to policies of requiring firms to pay the
pollution damage and/or eliminate the pollution stock with capital investment. Under these
policies, the firm’s tradeo↵ between control of the pollution flow and cleanup of the pollution
stock, as well as the extraction decisions, are analyzed. This thesis also provides the first step





The basic problem in environmental economics is the ine cient use of environmental
goods. People value these goods, but they are used without costs because of absent prop-
erty rights. Substantial literature has well studied the e ciency and uncertainty of remedy
policies, including emission taxes, tradable permits and subsidies for pollution abatement.
However, the allocation of property rights under these regulations has been generally over-
looked.1 When regulations are imposed, the ownership of environmental goods is mainly
allocated to government or polluters. The property rights are either implicitly held by the
government when charging emission taxes or auctioning tradable permits to the polluters, or
explicitly allocated to polluters by subsidizing abatement or issuing free tradable permits to
firms.2 However, an alternative approach is to assign the property rights of environmental
goods to victims - the households that are su↵ering from pollution generated by firms. This
paper considers the possibility of achieving e cient resource allocations by issuing tradable
permits to victims.
If tradable permits, representing the property rights of environmental goods, are assigned
to victims, a real market of environmental goods could be created, in which victims will be
“suppliers” of environmental goods and polluters will be “demanders”. Since the victims
have to consume some amount of other goods that are produced by polluters, they are also
referred to as consumers in this paper. They will make trade-o↵s between consumption of
other goods and environmental goods. Therefore, consumers will sell a limited amount of
1Literature has creative ideas on mechanisms of Pigovian tax, grandfathering permits, permits auctions,
abatement subsidies, etc. but often thinks little of how the property rights of environmental goods are
allocated under these policies. For example, see Montgomery [1],Hahn and Hester [2],Goulder [3], Fisher-
Vanden and Olmstead [4], Schmalensee and Stavins [5], Newell et al. [6] for excellent discussions on trading
permits. Also see Baumol [7], Buchanan and Tullock [8], Polinsky [9], Tietenberg [10], Hahn [11]for these
instruments.
2Transactions of property rights provide incentives for the parties to undertake pollution control via tax rate
or price signal and use the environmental goods e ciently.
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permits to polluters, and in the meantime, retire some permits according to their preferences.
The selling price and the total trading amount of the permits will be determined by the
supply curve of consumers and the demand curve of polluters. Furthermore, the equilibrium
market price could include any preferences of the consumers, for example, the preferences for
the existence values of a clear creek; concerns for future generations; choices between local
economic development and environmental protection, etc. Thus, the optimal pollution level
may be achieved through market transactions of permits between consumers and polluters.
One may argue that allocating property rights is simply a distribution question about
who will get benefits, but does not a↵ect the total value of society.3 However, this is not
necessarily true if there are multiple members sharing the property right, or sharing costs of
producing a common good. For example, if a group of consumers has to pay an amount of
money for polluters to engage in abatement, each consumer has an incentive to under-provide
payment and free ride on the contributions of others. As a result, the total value of society
decreases because there will be less abatement than the optimal level. This ine ciency, the
free rider problem, is also seen in the failure of Lindahl Equilibrium if individuals underreport
their preferences for public goods.4
Practical methods to solve the free rider problem are di cult to find. The Groves-
Ledyard mechanism provides a possible solution by formulating an ingenious allocation-
taxation scheme, which requires the assumption that Nash equilibrium decisions are chosen
by all consumers [13]. This stringent condition poses significant di culties for practical im-
plementation of the mechanism because each consumer has to know the behavior of all the
others to play the Nash equilibrium. In the situation where polluters own the property rights
of environmental goods, theoretically the government can implement the Groves-Ledyard
mechanism to tax households for optimal pollution abatement. However, it is di cult to
3As Coase [12] notes, economic e ciency is independent of the assignment of property rights if there are no
transaction costs.
4Some economists may argue that the free rider problem can be solved through thorough negotiation among
the parties and thus is a transaction cost problem. For the purpose of this paper, we will not assume away
the free rider problem by assuming the absence of transaction costs.
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reach e ciency in practice. For the households to play the Nash game rationally and e -
ciently, learning in games by considerable times of practices will be necessary before achieving
optimal pollution control.
By allocating the property rights of environmental goods to households, this thesis avoids
solving the free rider problem directly. The problem is not assumed away, either. Instead,
the free rider problem is transformed into a question of resource overuse by assigning free
tradable permits to consumers. If consumers own the property rights of the environmental
goods, the problem would be competitive consumption of the common goods for maximizing
selfish interest. Each rational consumer has an incentive to sell more permits to polluters
because the individual consumer will get the permit revenues but the incurred pollution will
be shared by all the consumers. Thus, the individual consumer incurs negative externality
to other consumers. As long as the polluters supply a price not lower than an individual
consumer’s marginal cost of su↵ering from pollution incurred by selling one more permit, the
consumer will sell that permit, no matter how big the total marginal cost is for the whole
consumer group. As a result, there will be too much pollution and environmental goods will
be overused.5
Both the free rider and overuse problems are studied in a marine resource case by Ar-
nason [14]. He examines the conflicting demands for fish between two groups: fisherman
and conservationists (non-extractive agents). He shows that the decentralized trading of
individual transferable quotas (ITQs) will fail to achieve the e cient outcomes because of
both the overuse problem in the fisherman group and the free rider problem in the conserva-
tionist group. Arnason concludes that if members in each group can somehow resolve their
internal contradictions and organize themselves into a unit, ITQs can in principle lead to
fully e cient resource allocation.
5In this mechanism we think there should be no holdout problem. The consumers do not have market power
in permit transactions because they also need to consume all the other goods produced by polluters. The
permits held by an individual consumer are not requisites to the polluters. Furthermore, if an individual
consumer chooses holdout, she may not be able to sell her permits in the future, but she will su↵er pollution
incurred by permits sold by other consumers.
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The question is, how to incentivize the self-interested individuals to act as one unit?
Fortunately, there are existing mechanisms to treat the overuse problem of common pool
resources, either renewable or nonrenewable. The mechanism of unitization has been used
to solve the externalities in common pool resources, for example, oil or gas field shared by
multiple landowners (for example, see Libecap and Wiggins [15]). For renewable common
pool resources, Ka ne and Costello [16] develop a comprehensive theory for internalizing
externalities across spatial owners in a fishery example. They generalize the notion of uni-
tization and find that a profit-sharing mechanism can yield first-best outcomes, even when
the self-interested agents voluntarily participate in the unitization scheme.
This paper extends the concept of unitization to environmental protection issues. Similar
to the spatial externalities in the fishery example by Ka ne and Costello [16], if a group of
consumers own the property rights of an environmental good, incentives of each consumer to
sell more permits and thus overuse the environmental good would hinder economic e ciency.
For the community-based tradable permits system, a sharing-benefit mechanism to solve the
externalities among the group of consumers is developed. If properly designed, the created
environmental market under the sharing-benefit mechanism can mitigate the externalities
and lead to e cient resource allocation. In addition, the mechanism does not require infor-
mation about private preferences on environmental goods. Market transactions will lead to
optimal pollution control and reveal private valuation of the environmental goods, which is
often di cult to measure.
Under existing regulations, governments or regulators have to determine the optimal
pollution level based on benefit-cost analysis, but may lack information on the real costs as
perceived by households. In a perfect world, if social benefits from consuming environmental
goods, and social costs from su↵ering “public bads” (losing some environmental goods)
are known exactly, it is easy for government to determine the optimal pollution level and
maximize net social benefits. However, in the real world, there is often no existing market
in which environmental goods or public bads are priced.
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Several complex methods have been developed to determine how people value environ-
mental goods, but the benefits of using these methods are suspect because the cost of obtain-
ing information is high. Thus, in some situations for environmental protection, government
may lack the information required for e cient regulation. By contrast, local households may
know their preferences on recreation values, aesthetic values, and other values of environ-
mental goods better than any agency. For example, when the 450 inhabitants in the Alpine
Valley of Switzerland voted to reject the exploration of the $1.2 billion goldmine found near
their villages [17], a regulatory body would have di culty determining what the real costs
to the villagers and their future generations are, or the compensation they would accept
to forego their picturesque mountain views. In this case, community-based allocation of
tradable permits may prove to be superior to traditional regulation methods.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2.1, a model for the case of
a sole consumer is developed. It is shown that if property rights are assigned to the sole
consumer, optimal amount of pollution is achieved via transactions between the polluter
and the consumer. In Section 2.2, a sharing-benefit mechanism is designed for multiple
consumers sharing the common property rights, finding that decentralized equilibrium also
can support an e cient resource allocation. In Section 2.3 the applications and limitations
of the models are discussed. Conclusions are given in Section 2.4.
2.1 Model for sole consumer
In this model, it is shown that if there is only one consumer and the permits that rep-
resent the property rights of environmental goods are assigned to the sole consumer, the
decentralized equilibrium supports social e ciency. A social planner does not have to decide
the optimal amount of permits issued. Market transactions of permits between the consumer
and polluters would endogenously determine the desired level of pollution.
For simplicity, this thesis focuses on river pollution as an example. Suppose a sole resident
living along the riverside consumes two kinds of goods: environmental goods, e, as gifts of
nature, and all the other goods, x, that are produced by a firm near the resident. Without
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any regulation, the firm would emit a pollutant at an amount of z̄ units into the river, which
would damage the clean water, scenic beauty, biodiversity around the river, etc., that the
resident enjoyed absent any pollution.
Now suppose property rights of the environmental goods are assigned by issuing z̄ units
of permits to the sole victim, the victim determines the pollution level by selling a limited
amount of permits z (0  z  z̄) to the firm and enjoys the remaining environmental goods.
The following assumptions are considered:
Assumption 1. There is no transaction cost.6
Assumption 2. Environmental goods e have a linear relationship with the units of physical
emissions.
Specifically, assumption 2 implies that one unit of emission will destroy one unit of envi-
ronmental good. The environmental goods that the sole consumer will consume can be
expressed as:
e = z̄   z (2.1)
For example, if the pre-policy emission level z̄ is 100 units of pollutant, the consumer
would be issued 100 permits. If the consumer sells 40 permits to the firm, the firm can emit
40 units of the pollutant and the consumer would enjoy 60 units of environmental goods. If
the consumer sells all her permits, z = z̄, then total post policy emissions are z̄, and the
environmental goods are destroyed, e = 0.
2.1.1 Social planner’s problem
The social planner’s problem is to maximize the social utility based on consumption of
environmental goods e, and all the other goods x. It is assumed that x is a function of labor
l and permits z that the firm buys from the consumer, and x is expressed by the production
function x = f(l, z). So the social planner’s problem is:





subject to x = f(l, z)
e = z̄   z
l = l̄
The Lagrangian form for the above problem is:
L = U(x, e)  ✓(x  f(l, z))  µ(e+ z   z̄)   (l   l̄) (2.3)
The first order conditions yield the Pareto E cient (PE) resource allocation x⇤, e⇤, l⇤,























At the social optimal solution, the marginal utilities of the environmental goods U
e
and
all the other goods U
x




and marginal product of permit f
0
z
are represented by the shadow prices as shown
in equations (2.5) and (2.6).
2.1.2 Decentralized problem
This section considers the decentralized decision made by the firms and the sole con-
sumer.7 One firm is taken as a representative of the polluters.
2.1.2.1 Firm’s problem
The firm’s problem is to maximize the profit from producing goods x:
Maximize ⇡ = p
x
f(l, z)  wl   p
z
z (2.7)
7The market is assumed to be in perfect competition. Thus, this paper does not consider the potential for
monopoly power.
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where w is the wage of labor and p
z
is the market price of permits, reflecting the price of



















2.1.2.2 Sole consumer’s problem
The sole consumer would select an amount of permits to sell to maximize utility based






x = wl̄ + ⇡ + p
z
z = wl̄ + ⇡ + p
z
(z̄   e)
In a perfectly competitive market, the profit ⇡ is zero. The Lagrangian form for the
above problem is:
L = U(x, e)   (p
x
















Proposition 1. The decentralized equilibrium of the sole consumer’s problem supports the
social e cient resource allocation.






= 1,w =  
µ





that satisfies the decentralized equilibrium. From equations (2.12), (2.8) and (2.9),















respectively, which shows that the decentralized
equilibrium (Walrasion Equilibrium) supports the Pareto E ciency.
Thus, the e cient resource allocation for the sole consumer problem is proven. If the social
planner issues permits to the sole consumer, the optimal pollution level will be achieved
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through market transactions between the consumer and the polluter. The total amount of
permits z̄ issued to the sole consumer does not a↵ect the e ciency results since the consumer
would retire some amount of permits according to her preferences. Even though the regulator
does not know the consumer’s preferences for consuming goods x and environmental goods




), the e cient resource allocation will be achieved. In addition,
from the transaction price of the permits, the value of environmental goods will be revealed.
This is not a surprise result for the sole consumer model. One may argue that the optimal
pollution level could also be achieved if permits are issued to polluters. The consumer
would buy some amount of permits from the polluters to achieve social e ciency. Without
transaction costs, the consumer can negotiate with the polluters one by one. This is just
what Coase [12] has proven. However, in the real world, there is probably not only one
victim or consumer. What will happen if multiple consumers share the property rights? The
following section considers the e ciency of assigning property rights to multiple consumers.
2.2 Model for multiple consumers
In reality, there is often more than one victim su↵ering pollution damages. Consider
the case where N residents live around the river in which the firms discharge the pollutant.
The level of harm may be di↵erent in various locations. The consumers may also have
di↵erent preferences for environmental goods and all the other goods. For this case, a model
is designed to distribute the permits among the group of consumers according to di↵erent
pollution levels su↵ered by each consumer. Then market transactions are checked to see if
they can yield e cient resource allocation or not.
2.2.1 Social planner’s problem
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Equation (2.15) shows, at the social optimal level, the ratio of marginal utilities of envi-







) is defined by
the relative shadow price ✓
µ
. In the following, we will see whether the decentralized solution
supports the social e ciency or not.
2.2.2 Decentralized problem
Since the firm’s problem for the case of multiple consumers is the same as that in the
sole consumer case, this section uses the solution of the firm’s problem from Section 2.1.2 in
the following analysis.
2.2.2.1 Initial distribution of permits
The level of harm for each consumer living around the river may be di↵erent in various
locations. For example, the people who live near the emission point of the firm may su↵er
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more than others who live further away as the level of the pollutant may disperse as the
water flows down-stream. This thesis assumes that the pollutant distributes along the river,
and adopts the following assumption regarding distribution of pollution:
Assumption 3. An arbitrary location i along the river su↵ers k
i
percent (0  k
i
< 1) of
the total emissions of the pollutant.
Specifically, prior to any regulation, location i would su↵er an amount of k
i
z̄ units of pollu-
tant.8
According to the physical distribution level of the pollutant, the initial permits distribu-
tion is designed as follows. An arbitrary consumer i who lives in location i along the river
will be issued k
i
z̄ units of permits. Thus, the property rights of environmental goods is di-
vided to N consumers according to the di↵erent pollution levels. It should be noted that the
assignment is independent of the valuation of environmental goods but only depends on the
physical pollution levels. In a special case where the pollutant is equally distributed among




for all i, and each consumer would be assigned 1
N
z̄
permits to represent her property rights of the environmental goods. In the following, this
thesis focuses on the general case where k
i
is not necessarily the same for all i.















will di↵use to all the other residents living around the river. On the other hand, consumer
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(z̄   z), where z is the total amount of
permits sold by all the consumers, z =
P
N
j=1 zj. In a special situation where all the permits
8The total amount of pollutant at all locations is z̄,
PN
i=1 kiz̄ = z̄.
9This idea is similar to the fishery with spatial connectivity example in Ka ne and Costello (2011), where
patch owner i has fish dispersal to other patches while also receiving dispersal from other patches. [16]
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i=1 ei = 0.
2.2.2.2 Without sharing benefit mechanism
Under the model for multiple consumers, it is assumed that there is complete information
distribution among the consumers. Each consumer knows the information that how many
permits have been sold out and at what prices, to make her decision whether to sell or to
retire her permits, or to buy some permits from the neighbors for selling at higher prices or
retiring.
In the decentralized case, an individual consumer i would maximize her utility based
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Proposition 2. The decentralized equilibrium for the multiple consumers’ problem does not
support the socially e cient resource allocation.






= 1, w =  
µ












the decentralized equilibrium. Compared to equation (2.15), clearly the decentralized
equilibrium does not support Pareto E ciency.
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If we relax Assumption 3 to allow k
i
= 1 ( k
j
= 0 for all j 6= i), then equation (2.21) supports
the social e ciency. In other words, the decentralized solutions with multiple consumers do
not support the e cient resource allocation unless the multiple consumers could be treated
as one unit, or there is only one consumer. This result is similar to the marine resource case
by Arnason [14], who shows that if multiple members can somehow organize themselves into
a single unit, e cient outcomes could be achieved.
In all other cases, market failure results from the competitive consumption of environmen-
tal goods by the group of consumers. If consumer i sells one permit, she incurs k
i
pollution
to herself while the remaining (1 k
i
) pollutant disperses to other consumers along the river.
Thus, she imposes negative externalities to all the other consumers. In contrast, if consumer
i retires one permit, all the other consumers get a benefit from su↵ering less pollution. In
this way, consumer i generates positive externalities for all the other consumers. In other
words, all the other consumers free ride on the contribution of consumer i if she retires her
permits. In order to maximize the personal utility, clearly a rational consumer would prefer
free riding on others instead of being free ridden by others. As a result, each consumer has
incentives to sell one more permits to the polluters as long as the price can cover her own
marginal cost, no matter how great the total marginal cost is for all other consumers. The
competition within the consumers for selling their permits to the polluters will incur too
much pollution and the environmental goods will be overused.
2.2.2.3 Sharing benefit mechanism
The market failure for the case of multiple consumers even with well-defined property
rights and no transaction costs has been shown. As discussed above, the reason is that
the benefit of selling one permit is gained by one consumer but the costs of pollution are
shared by the whole group. In the following, a sharing benefit mechanism is considered
to redistribute the benefits of selling permits to ensure each consumer gets compensation.
Specifically, the following assumption is adopted:
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Assumption 4. All revenues from selling permits are collected in a pool and then redis-
tributed. Consumer i gets  
i
percent of revenues from the pool.
Under Assumption 4, consumer i will get  
i
percent of the revenue from selling her permits
and she also can get  
i
percent of the revenue if any other consumer sell his permits.
The problem for consumer i then is to maximize her utilities subjected to her budget
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Proposition 3. If each consumer gets redistributed benefits according to the level of harm




, the decentralized equilibrium would achieve the e cient
resource allocation.
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at decentralized equilibrium, which supports the
social Pareto E ciency.
Therefore, under the well-designed sharing benefit mechanism, the decentralized equilibrium
of multiple consumers’ problem can achieve socially e cient resource allocation. It should
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be noted that the information about an arbitrary consumer i’s marginal utilities of con-






is not required to be known to generate e ciency. The
decentralized equilibrium will be achieved by market transactions.
From equation (2.24) it is found that the benefit redistribution rate  
i
is really crucial
for decentralized equilibrium and e ciency. If the redistribution rate is not in accordance
with the harmful percentage rate k
i
, the decentralized equilibrium will not support the
social planner’s solution, and there will be market failure. The reason is that an individual
consumer will respond to maximize her own utility only. If consumer i gets more from the




, she has incentives
to sell more permits than the optimal amount and incur damages to other consumers who
get less from the pool. The sharing benefit mechanism can eliminate the overuse problem




, and thus ensure that each consumer will get
compensation according to the level of harm.
The sharing-benefit mechanism unitizes the consumers through the permit-revenue pool
and eliminates the incentives to sell permits competitively within the group. Under the
mechanism, an individual consumer will be worse o↵ if she sells more permits than the
optimal amount. The reason is that, selling more permits will generate more pollution
but cannot be covered by the redistributed revenue to the individual consumer. On the
other hand, if fewer permits are sold to the firm, the consumers will lose some benefits of
consuming all the other goods x because the firm will produce less amount of x without
su cient permits.
Based on the above result, this paper also designs another way for benefit distribution
if Assumption 4 is relaxed. In a case that the consumers would prefer to hold a proportion
of the revenue of selling their permits, from Proposition 3, the following useful result can be
derived:
Corollary 1. If each consumer holds a fixed ↵ (0 < ↵ < 1) percent of the revenue of
selling her permits, the new benefit redistribution rate  
0
i
from the pool will depend on
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↵. Specifically, the new redistribution rate  
0
i
= kiz ↵zi(1 ↵)z also can yield e cient resource
allocation.







rium price of permits and z is the equilibrium quantity of traded permits. If each con-










From Proposition 3, we know that each consumer should get a benefit that equals the













z, we get the redistribution rate
from the shrunken benefit pool  
0
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represents the uncompensated damage to consumer i before
the benefit redistribution, and (1  ↵)z is the shrunken benefit pool. Also, the sum of




















(1 ↵)z = 1, which shows
the balance of the revenue pool.
2.3 Application and limitations
This section discusses the information e↵ects both on the community-based permit sys-
tem and the centralized policy making. The potential advantages and limitations of the
mechanism in the real world are analyzed.
Benefit-cost analysis is a powerful technique for market-based policymaking even though
there are several di culties in practice. One major issue is the valuation of non-market
goods, such as environmental goods. In some situations, the government may have infor-
mation advantages in determining the total costs and benefits to make policies; while in
other situations, it may be better to encourage individuals who are more familiar with the
circumstances and changes of their preferences to make the tradeo↵s by themselves.
This paper has made the assumption that consumers have complete information. The
consumers know their cost curves, the benefit curve of the firm, how many permits have
been sold and at what prices, etc., to make decisions. If the pollution a↵ects a small area,
the consumers might have su cient information to determine the optimal pollution level.
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They can make tradeo↵s between environmental goods and other goods according to their
revenues, preference changes, concerns for future generations, and other circumstances. For
some environmental goods, this kind of information is di cult to determine for centralized
policy makers.
However, in other situations, the government or regulators may have advantages in col-
lecting and processing information to make decisions on pollution control. Individuals may
not know how harmful the pollutant is. For example, households may not know the rela-
tionship between higher disease rates and SO2 levels, while the government has advantages
in gathering statistical information to determine the optimal capped pollution level. Also,
the SO2 pollution will a↵ect a large area and acid rain may occur hundreds of miles away
from the SO2 emission points. If the permits are issued to residents in this case, a much
larger area has to be covered and the information distribution may not be e cient. In these
situations, assigning property rights to households may not lead to e cient outcomes.
Issuing tradable permits to consumers is also helpful to measure the monetary value of
environmental goods. When a consumer decides to sell some permits, the selling price of the
permits reflects how the consumer values her environmental goods. The price of selling could
include the consumer’s preferences regarding tradeo↵s between consumption of other goods
and environmental goods, her concerns for future generations, interests in existing values of
environmental goods, etc., which are di cult to determine by other valuation approaches.
2.4 Conclusion
Environmental goods are used ine ciently because of absent property rights. Some
market-based solutions, including emission taxes, subsidies, and tradable permits, allocate
the property rights of the environmental goods to either government or polluters. How-
ever, these policies do not necessarily generate e cient outcomes due to high expenses and
uncertainties in valuing environmental goods and measuring social costs. Government or
regulators may lack the information to determine the optimal control levels.
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By contrast, in some cases local households may know their preferences better than any
agency. This thesis concerns assigning property rights of environmental goods to house-
holds that are su↵ering from pollution generated by firms. By issuing tradable permits to
households (also referred to as victims or consumers), this thesis designs a market in which
consumers will be “suppliers” of environmental goods and polluters will be “demanders”. In
a free market, the selling price, and the total trading amount of the permits are determined
by the supply curve of consumers and the demand curve of polluters. Furthermore, the
transaction price of permits reveals the monetary value of the environmental goods.
For a special case with a sole consumer, it has been shown that market transactions of
permits between the consumer and polluters can lead to an optimal pollution level. For
the case with multiple consumers, the major challenge of the created market is competitive
consumption of the environmental goods among the group of multiple members. Simply put,
one consumer can receive benefits from selling her permits to polluters but incur pollution
su↵ered by the whole group. Thus, each consumer has incentives to sell more of her permits
and the environmental goods will be overused. To eliminate the externalities within the group
of consumers, this thesis extends the concept of unitization to environmental protection
and develops a sharing-benefit mechanism. From a river pollution example, it has been
shown that under a well-designed sharing-benefit mechanism, e ciency holds for multiple
consumers, and the externality within the group can be eliminated. In addition, neither
regulators nor consumers have to know how an individual consumer values the environmental
goods. The transaction market will reveal the preferences of the consumers.
The e ciency of the created market for environmental goods is limited by information
distribution. In some situations, households are more familiar with the circumstances and
changes to make e cient tradeo↵s. However, in other situations, government agencies may
have advantages in comparing the aggregated costs and benefits to make policies. For exam-
ple, government can collect and process information to get statistical relationships between
disease rates and SO2 levels, while households might not know the social costs of health
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damage by SO2 pollution. In these situations, it might be better to rely on government or
regulators to make decisions on e cient emission levels.
The mechanism of assigning property rights to households may also generate a pollution
“leakage” problem. Firms may be pushed to move to areas with lower population den-
sity, lower revenues, and relatively less preference for environmental goods, etc. Thus, the
pollution may be concentrated in some areas but the total amount may not be reduced.
Generally, assigning property rights to households provides a method of decentralized
decision making to consider solutions for pollution problems and other externality problems.
The mechanism is also helpful for measuring the monetary value of environmental goods.
However, we should note the limitation of the mechanism in information distribution. For
the cases in which government or regulators have advantages in collecting and processing
information, it might be better to rely on centralized decision making to determine the
optimal pollution levels if this information cannot be easily revealed to households.
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NATURAL RESOURCE USE WITH REVERSIBLE STOCK POLLUTION CONTROL
A large scale of traditional agriculture land in China has been terribly polluted during
the process of industrialization. Heavy metal pollution in soil is a large contributor. On
the mainland of China, over 10% of farmland, about 24.7 million acres has been polluted by
heavy metals.10 Heavy metals cannot be eliminated by biodegradation and will remain in
soil after several decades or even centuries [1]. It is very expensive and di cult to remove
heavy metals from soil [Soil Quality 2]. Heavy metals can accumulate in plants and animal
bodies to a harmful level [3]. The contaminated land, if used for agriculture again, will grow
deleterious food for both animals and humans. Annually, over 12 million tons of grains are
contaminated by heavy metals, with direct economic loss of more than 20 billion yuan (about
3 billion USD) per year on the mainland of China.11 The Chinese government is investing
heavily for reducing pollution and recovering soil production for the safety of the food sup-
ply.12 Nevertheless, new pollution is spreading to larger areas along with mining and rapid
development of industry. A strategy, “pollute first, eliminate later”, which means polluting
and su↵ering damages during the developing period, and then recovering in the future when
there is plenty of wealth, is often believed to be an inevitable process in economic develop-
ment.13 However, it should be asked, do we pollute too much now? Do we eliminate too late?
Can the costs and damages caused by pollution be o↵set by the developing benefits? More
and more environmental costs born by society show that this strategy should be considered
comprehensively. Even though pollution is not totally avoidable, for the stock pollutant,
10According to data from Ministry of Land and Resources of the People’s Republic of China.
11According to data from Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China.
12In 2011, China’s first five-year budget plan for heavy metal pollution announced 75 billion yuan (11.4
billion USD) to reduce the heavy metal release in key regions by 15% from the 2007 level. [4, 5]
13This strategy, also known as “ Grow first, then clean up” [6], is developed from the theory of Environmental
Kuznets Curve (EKC) [7, 8]. EKC is an inverted-U curve and shows that “pollution often appears first to
worsen and later to improve as countries’ incomes grow”[9]. It is not hard to imagine the EKC will appear
if the way of “pollute first, eliminate late” is followed intentionally.
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there is a tradeo↵ between controlling the pollution flow now and abating the stock in the
future.
Substantial literature has well studied the optimal pollution control with special natural
decay rate for stock pollution.14 The self-purification rate of nature is considered to be the
main capacity of pollution stock elimination. Some economists consider a constant natural
decay rate. One of the standout models is developed by Keeler et al. [12]. They maximize
the total discounted social utility based on goods consumption and pollution stock which
decays at a constant exponential rate. By this general equilibrium model, the authors find
the pollution path and the steady state equilibria, where both the capital accumulation and
pollution stock are held constant. Using a similar model to Keeler et al. (1971), some other
papers consider that the natural purification rates depend upon the pollution stock levels.
Forster [13] introduces a non-constant exponential decay rate, which can be depressed if
the pollution stock level is great enough. Toman and Withagen [14] analyze some di↵erent
forms of pollution assimilation function and emphasize that the assimilation capacity can
disappear under su ciently high pollution stock levels. The same feature that pollution
stock can reduce the decay rate to zero is also adopted by Cheve [15]. In these models, the
pollution stock is assumed to be reduced by natural decay and is considered to be irreversible
once the natural decay rate is zero. Not considering the natural decay, Farzin [16] assumes
once the pollution stock is created, there is no way to clean up.
However, these assumptions are limiting, since most of the pollution stock can also be
removed through capital investment, and some of the pollutants, for example, heavy metals,
have a very slow natural decay rate and require technology to clean them up.15 Unlike the
existing literature, this thesis considers that the pollution stock, the same as the pollution
flow, can be reduced by capital investment. In addition, rather than natural decay, capital
14More generally, dynamic models for stock pollutants with natural decay have been examined by Hoel and
Karp [10], Newell and Pizer [11].
15Many treatments, for example, solidifying agents, washing process, phytoremediation, etc., are used for
metal contaminated soil. [Soil Quality 2]
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investment is assumed to be the main capacity for stock pollution abatement.16
In many real situations, people do not wait for the natural decay process. Usually, there is
large investment in cleaning up pollutants because of concerns for potential threats on human
health and other environmental factors. For developing countries like China, the safety of
the food supply is one of the vital considerations. Thus, the recovery of polluted farmland
and water is essential despite the substantial investments required. Another example is the
global CO2 emission problem. Both the flow and stock are so large that the existing natural
assimilation process cannot be relied upon as the only way for eliminating the greenhouse
e↵ects. Instead, capital investment in abatement is desirable. For example, the carbon
o↵sets and the superfund program in cleaning up hazardous wastes sites [17] are important
programs for cleaning up stock pollutants by monetary investment. Thus, for economic
research related with pollution accumulation e↵ects, the important role of capital investment
in pollution stock abatement should not be ignored.
Even though there is a high probability of extensive damage and large recovery cost
caused by pollutant emissions, pollution control in the developing period is often given
less weight by the government, especially when economic development is valued simply by
maintaining a high level of GDP growth. The perception of “pollute first, eliminate later”
often ignores the damages caused by the pollution in the current period and the costs for
elimination in the future.
In this thesis, by comparing the pollution damage, recovery cost and the benefit of natural
resource use, the strategy on how to make tradeo↵s between polluting now and eliminat-
ing in the future is developed. In a natural resource extraction model with externalities of
heavy metal pollution in surrounding farmland, three policy regimes for the reversible stock
pollution control are considered: (1) the mining firm is required to pay both the current
period pollution damage and future land recovery cost; (2) the firm has to pay the pollution
damage during the extraction period; (3) the firm shall be responsible for polluted land re-
16This thesis does not deny the function of natural decay. It can be considered as a subsidiary process that
helps to reduce the capital investment in stock pollution cleanup.
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covery after the extraction activity. For each regime, this study analyzes the firm’s pollution
control strategy and the mineral extraction path. The pollution recovery process is assumed
to be achieved mainly by capital investment. By a simple dynamic model, the following
questions are addressed: what kind of environmental policies can be designed for the control
of reversible stock pollution that requires capital-invested abatement? How should the pol-
lution flow be controlled at each period? What’s the natural resource extraction path under
di↵erent policies?
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section 3.1, the model for mineral
extraction with externalities caused by heavy metal pollution in the surrounding farmland
is developed. Three policy regimes for the heavy metal pollution control are considered. For
each of them, the mining firm’s pollution control strategy and mineral extraction path are
analyzed. In Section 3.2, numerical simulation is given to compare di↵erent policy regimes.
Conclusions are provided in Section 3.3.
3.1 The model
Using the heavy metal pollution example, suppose near a traditional farmland area, there
is a mineral reserve R0 that is going to be extracted. It is assumed that the extraction path
is q(t) (the quantity of mineral extracted at time t) and the price of the mineral is fixed
at p. The mineral exploitation will generate heavy metal pollution to surrounding soils
and damage nearby agriculture production and other environmental factors. It is assumed
that the pollution path is a(t) (the acres of farmland polluted at time t), and the pollution
damage on per acre land is a fixed amount of D at each period. Once one acre of land is
polluted by heavy metals, the agriculture production cannot be recovered until the heavy
metals are removed from the farmland. Thus, for per acre of polluted land, the damage
D will accumulate annually. Since most of the heavy metals cannot be eliminated through
biodegradation or other natural decay processes, capital investment is necessary for soil
reclamation by other methods. It is assumed that the cost of recovering one acre of polluted
land is c3, which can represent the discounted sum of unit costs of recovering one acre of
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land in an optimal path after the extraction activity.
The social planner considers the losses of agriculture production and other environmental
factors, and thus requires the mining firm to internalize these costs. There could be several
policy regimes. First, to internalize all the externalities, this thesis considers that the firm is
required to pay not only the current damages caused by pollution, but also the future land
recovery cost after the extraction activity. However, realistically, there are other situations.
For example, the firm may declare bankruptcy and avoid the cleanup cost, or the firm may be
required to be responsible for reclamation only, as in the cases of the bonding regulations17 in
surface mining and drilling (SMCRA [18], CFR3104 [19]). For the real world situations, two
simple versions of the policy are provided. For the cases where firms may shirk the liability
of land recovery , the regime that requires the firm to pay the current pollution damage
during its extraction period is considered. Another regime, similar to the bonding policy,
requires the firm to clean up the heavy metals from the polluted land after the mining.
In the following, this thesis first analyzes the regulation under which the firm is required
to pay both the pollution damage and the land recovery cost. As a response, the firm can
select to invest in pollution control to contaminate fewer acres of land, and thus pay less
compensation for the current period damage and less cost for future cleanup. In a dynamic
model, this study considers how the firm makes tradeo↵s between investing in pollution
control and paying compensation plus recovery cost to approach an optimal pollution path.
To analyze how the mineral extraction will be a↵ected by the regulation, the firm’s extraction
path is compared to the path under no environmental regulation. The second policy regime
considers the impacts if the firm is only required to pay the pollution damage during its
extraction period. Finally, the policy under which the firm does not have to pay any damage
but has to recover the polluted land after the mining is analyzed. For each policy regime,
the firm’s responses in two aspects are discussed: one is the strategy on pollution control;
and the other is the mineral extraction path.
17The bond is a financial assurance held in an escrow account for reclamation after the mining.
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To analyze the paths of pollution control and mineral extraction, the following cost
functions of the mining firm are considered:
Assumption 1: The cost function for mineral extraction is c1(q) = ↵q +  q2 and the
pollution control function is c2(q, a) =  a   + q, where all parameters are assumed to
be positive.
Specifically, it is assumed that the pollution control cost c2(q, a) is greater at larger extraction
quantity (@c2
@q
> 0) but at smaller polluted acres (@c2
@a
< 0). That is, for one fewer acre of
land to be polluted (more acre of land to be protected), the firm has to make an investment,
which equals the absolute value of @c2
@a
, to stop the spreading of heavy metals. Therefore,
more investments are needed if less acres of land are to be polluted. Conversely, if one more
acre of land is polluted, the firm can save a marginal control cost (equals the absolute value
of @c2
@a
). As a tradeo↵, the firm will need to pay the damage compensation and the recovery
cost or either of them, according to di↵erent policy regimes, for the polluted land.
3.1.1 Model for internalizing both the damage and recovery cost
This section analyzes the policy regime under which the firm is required to pay both the
pollution damage and the land recovery cost. In the following, the firm’s pollution control
strategy is first analyzed, followed by its extraction path.
3.1.1.1 Strategy on pollution control
Under the policy regime of internalizing both the pollution damage and recovery cost,
except paying the extraction cost c1(q), the mining firm shall pay a damage D per acre of
land to compensate for agriculture and other losses on the accumulating polluted land A(t)
at each period. In addition, the firm has to pay the cost c3 to remove heavy metals from
each acre of polluted land after the extraction activity. If more acres of land are polluted,
the firm has to pay more for pollution damage and land recovery. Instead, the firm may
choose to pay a cost of c2(q, a) to control the heavy metals from spreading to larger areas.
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Therefore, the firm can invest more in pollution control and save some costs in damage and






[pq   c1(q)  c2(q, a) D(A(t))]e rtdt  c3A(T )e rT (3.1)
subject to Ṙ =  q(t)
Ȧ = a(t)
R(0) = R0 and A(0) = 0 given,
where T represents the terminal time under the policy of internalizing both the damage
and recovery cost of the polluted land, and r is the discount rate. As mentioned above,
c3 is the sum of discounted unit costs in an optimal period of time to recover one acre of
polluted land after the extraction activity. c3A(T ) is used to represent the total recovery
cost at terminal time T . It is important to note that c3A(T ) does not mean that the land
recovery is completed at that time.
It should be noted that the mining firm may not physically deplete the mine if the
environmental policy is imposed, where the cost of producing rises and the mineral in the
ground has no economic value any more. As such, at the terminal time T , the physical
quantity of the mineral in the ground R(T ) may not be zero. In this case, it is said that the
mine is economically depleted, rather than physically depleted.
The current value Hamiltonian equation is:
H = pq   c1(q)  c2(q, a) D(A(t)) +  1( q(t)) +  2(a(t)) (3.2)












+  2 = 0 (3.4)
 ̇1 = r 1 (3.5)
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 ̇2 = r 2 +D (3.6)
If the terminal condition R(T ) is not zero, the shadow value of the mineral in the ground
 1 will be zero. Since both the terminal time T and the terminal condition A(T ) are free,
the transversality conditions are as follows:
 2(T ) =  c3  D (3.7)
H(T ) =  Da(T )  rc3A(T ) (3.8)
 2 is negative and represents the firm’s shadow loss of polluting one more acre land (the
damage and recovery cost that the firm has to pay for that polluted land). Or in other words,
 2 represents the firm’s shadow value of polluting one fewer acre land (the firm avoids the
expenses for damage and recovery). It equals the marginal cost of pollution control @c2
@a
at
each period. Equation (3.7) shows that if both the damage and recovery externalities are
internalized, then at the terminal time, the loss of polluting one more acre of land  2(T )
equals the damage in the current period D plus recovery cost c3. Depending on the relative
sizes of the damage D and the recovery cost c3, we have the following proposition 1.
Proposition 1. If the pollution damage D and land recovery cost c3 are internalized, under
the condition c3 <
D
r
 D, the mining firm has a marginal cost decreasing with time to
control the pollution spreading. If c3 >
D
r
  D, the marginal cost of pollution control
will increase with time.
Proof. From equations (3.6) and (3.7), we can get the marginal loss caused by land pollution
 2 =  (c3 + D   D
r
)er(t T )   D
r
. With equation (3.12), we get the absolute value of
the marginal cost of pollution control |c2a| = |@c2
@a
| = (c3 +D   D
r
)er(t T ) + D
r
. Under
the condition c3 <
D
r
  D, we have @|c2a|
@t
< 0, which shows that the marginal cost is
decreasing according to time. When c3 >
D
r
 D, we have @|c2a|
@t
> 0 and the marginal
cost increases with time.
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In other words, as long as the marginal cost of pollution control is greater than the lifelong
time accumulated damage, (D   D
r
)er(t T ) + D
r
, plus the discounted future recovery cost,
c3e
r(t T ) , the mining firm could pollute one more acre of land. Once it is more expensive
to compensate for the damage and recover the land, the firm shall keep the pollutant in a
fixed area and pollute no more acres.
Under Assumption 1, we will have the marginal cost of control @c2
@a
=    a   1 and the
land pollution path a(t) = (  )
1
 +1 ((c3 +D   D
r








  D, we have @a(t)
@t
> 0, which shows an increasing trend of land pollution as time
increases. That is, if the land recovery cost is not very high, for example, c3 is not over
nineteen times higher (at the discount rate r = 0.05) than the damage D, then the firm will
find that polluting fewer acres of land in the beginning is economically reasonable because
the lifelong time accumulated damage is more significant. In another situation, if the future
recovery cost is extremely great or the discount rate is high, we may have c3   D
r
 D and
the land pollution has a constant (if c3 =
D
r
 D ) or decreasing path (if c3 > D
r
 D). In the
case of a decreasing pollution path, the discounted recovery cost at each period places more
weights than the lifelong time accumulated damage, and thus the firm will pollute fewer and
fewer as the large recovery cost is coming nearer.
Under the policy of internalizing both the pollution damage and the stock abatement
cost, the mining firm should make a tradeo↵ between paying these costs and investing in
pollution control. If the cost of pollution control is greater, then the firm may choose to
pollute more acres of land and pay the damage as well as the stock abatement cost. Once
the sum of the payments for damage and land recovery is greater, the firm will invest in
pollution control and keep the pollutant in certain areas.
Under this policy, the mining firm will change its extraction path according to the damage
levels and di culty of recovery. In the following, the firm’s response in extraction to the
regulation is discussed.
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3.1.1.2 The extraction path
Equation (3.16) shows the terminal condition of the Hamiltonian equation. By equation
(3.2), we also have H(T ) = pq(T )  c1(q)  c2(q, a(T )) D(A(T ))+ 1( q(T ))+ 2(a(T )) at
the terminal time T . Combined with first order conditions, we have the following proposition
2.
Proposition 2. When the pollution damage and stock abatement cost are required to be
internalized, the life of the mine is shorter than the case with no environmental regu-
lations.
Proof. From equations (3.2), (3.7) and (3.16), we can get  q(T )2 =  a(T )   + DA(T ) +
c3a(T ) rc3A(T ). In absence of the regulations (D = 0,C3 = 0), the firm has no incen-
tive to invest in any pollution control. The investment in land pollution control  a  
will be near zero, and thus  q(T o)2 ⇡ 0, where T o represents the reserve exhausting
time with no regulations. Thus we have q(T ) > q(T o). By the constraint
´
T
0 q(t) = R0
and equations (3.3) and (3.5), we have p ↵  2  (T  
1
r






(1  e rT o)) = R0. Since q(T )
r
(1  e rT ) > 0, we know that the right






we can prove that under the policy of internalizing both the pollution damage and
abatement cost, the extraction time T is shorter than the time with no regulations,
T < T o.
In the above model, the social planner wants the firm to internalize not only the damage
caused by the pollution at each period, but also the pollution stock abatement cost after
the extraction activity. In other situations, the firm may be required to pay the pollution
damage only, or the recovery cost only. The pollution control and mineral extraction paths
will be di↵erent. Other policy regimes are analyzed in the following.
18If the mineral is not physically depleted under the environmental policy, the right hand side of the previous
equation is even much smaller than R0.
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3.1.2 Model for internalizing the damage only
In the cases where the firms can declare bankruptcy and avoid the recovery cost, this
thesis considers the policy that the firm is required to pay the pollution damage at each
period. In the following, the firm’s pollution control strategy is first analyzed followed by
the extraction path.
3.1.2.1 Strategy on pollution control
If the mining firm has to pay the pollution damage but does not remove heavy metals
from the polluted land after the extraction activity, the firm will need to pay a damage D for
the accumulating polluted land A(t) but not pay recovery cost c3. With this policy regime,






[pq   c1(q)  c2(q, a) D(A(t))]e rtdt (3.9)
subject to Ṙ =  q(t)
Ȧ = a(t)
R(0) = R0 and A(0) = 0 given,
where TD represents the terminal time when the mine is depleted (either economically
or physically) under the policy of internalizing the pollution damage only.
The current value Hamiltonian equation is:
H = pq   c1(q)  c2(q, a) D(A(t)) +  1( q(t)) +  2(a(t)) (3.10)












+  2 = 0 (3.12)
 ̇1 = r 1 (3.13)
 ̇2 = r 2 +D (3.14)
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If the terminal condition R(T ) is not zero, the shadow value of the mineral in the ground
 1 will be zero. Since both the terminal time TD and the terminal condition A(TD) are free,
the transversality conditions are as follows:
 2(T
D) =  D (3.15)
H(TD) =  Da(TD) (3.16)
Equation (3.15) shows that, if the damage is internalized, at the terminal time, the firm’s
loss of polluting one more acre of land  2(TD) equals the unit damage D. Considering the
marginal cost of pollution control, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under the policy of internalizing the pollution damage, the mining firm
has a marginal cost decreasing with time to control the pollution spreading until that
marginal cost of control equals the unit land damage caused by the pollution.
Proof. From equations (3.14) and (3.15), we can get the shadow loss caused by land pollu-





. With equation (3.12), we get the marginal investment
in pollution control |c2a| = |@c2
@a





, which shows that the absolute
value of marginal cost is decreasing according to time (@|c2a|
@t
< 0), until it equals the
unit damage D at t = TD.
In other words, as long as the marginal cost of pollution control is greater than the lifelong





, the mining firm could pollute one more
acre of land. Once it is more expensive to compensate for the damage, the firm should keep
the pollutant in a fixed area and pollute no more acres.
With the same cost function for pollution control under Assumption 1, we have the
marginal cost of control @c2
@a










   1 , which shows an increasing trend of land pollution as time increases
(@a(t)
@t
> 0). This is because the damage is accumulating for the polluted land. The earlier
the land is polluted, the more compensation the firm has to pay. Therefore, the firm will
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pollute fewer acres of land at the beginning but more at the later period of extraction.
Compared with the policy of internalizing both the pollution damage and the stock
abatement cost, intuitively the firm will pollute more acres of land at each period if only the
pollution damage is internalized. With the obligation of land reclamation in the future, the
firm has incentives to invest more in pollution control at each period, considering the future
costs for recovering large acres of polluted land.
With the policy of internalizing the pollution damage only, the mining firm will change
its extraction path according to the damage levels. In the following, the firm’s extraction
path under this regulation is discussed.
3.1.2.2 The Extraction Path
For the extraction path under the policy of internalizing the pollution damage, similar
to the Proposition 2, we have:
Proposition 4. When the policy requires the pollution damage to be internalized, the life of
the mine is shorter than the case with no environmental regulations.
Proof. From equations (3.10), (3.15) and (3.16), we can get  q(TD)2 =  a(TD)  +DA(TD).
Compared with the terminal condition  q(T o)2 ⇡ 0 in absence of the regulation, we
have q(TD) > q(T o). By the constraint
´
T
0 q(t) = R0 and equations (3.11) and (3.13),
we have p ↵  2  (T
D   1
r
(1   e rTD)) = R0   q(T
D)
r






)) = R0. Since
q(TD)
r
(1   e rTD) > 0, we know that the right hand side of the





> 0, we can prove
that under the policy of internalizing the pollution damage, the extraction time TD is
shorter than the time with no regulations, TD < T o.
Intuitively, since the pollution damage is accumulating with time for one acre of land that
is polluted, the firm has to pay the damage every period until the extraction activity is
19If the mineral is not physically depleted under the environmental policy, the right hand side of the previous
equation is even much smaller than R0.
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completed. A shorter period of operation will be more profitable if the pollution damage is
internalized. Therefore, the firm has incentives to extract the mine in a shorter period of
time to avoid more cost in damage compensation which is accumulating as time increases.
It is hard to compare the extraction time between di↵erent policy regimes. Under the
policy of internalizing both the damage and the recovery cost, the firm has to consider two
di↵erent e↵ects, caused by the accumulating damage and the discounted recovery cost. Since




, if T is longer, the value of




is greater. Intuitively, if the recovery cost c3 is relatively large or the discount rate is high, the
firm may extract the mineral a little slower to avoid the large recovery cost coming too soon.
Under the policy of paying the damage, the firm considers only the increasing accumulated
damage as time increases and thus has incentives to extract the mine in a shorter period.
Under the above regulation, the firm only pays the damage but does not have to pay
any recovery cost for land rehabilitation in the future. In the following model, the policy of
internalizing the land recovery cost after the extraction activity is analyzed.
3.1.3 Model for internalizing the recovery cost only
The existing bonding regulation for reclamation of surface mining areas, and oil and gas
wells in the U.S. are examples of requiring the mining firms to recover the disturbed land. In
the following, the firm’s pollution control strategy and the extraction path under the regime
of internalizing the recovery cost after the extraction activity are analyzed.
3.1.3.1 Strategy on pollution control
With this policy regime, the firm shall pay the recovery cost c3 for polluted land reha-
bilitation after the mining, but does not have to pay any damage on the polluted land A(t).










subject to Ṙ =  q(t)
Ȧ = a(t)
R(0) = R0 and A(0) = 0 given,
where TC represents the terminal time under the policy of internalizing the recovery cost
of the polluted land, and r is the discount rate.
The current value Hamiltonian equation is:
H = pq   c1(q)  c2(q, a) +  1( q(t)) +  2(a(t)) (3.18)












+  2 = 0 (3.20)
 ̇1 = r 1 (3.21)
 ̇2 = r 2 (3.22)
If the terminal condition R(T ) is not zero, the shadow value of the mineral in the ground
 1 will be zero. Since both the terminal time TC and the terminal condition A(TC) are free,
the transversality conditions are as follows:
 2(T
C) =  c3 (3.23)
H(TC) =  rc3A(TC) (3.24)
Equation (3.23) shows that, if only the land recovery cost is internalized, at the terminal
time, the loss of polluting one more acre of land  2(TC) equals the recovery cost c3. We have
the following proposition:
Proposition 5. If the land recovery cost is internalized, the mining firm has a marginal
cost increasing with time to control the pollution spreading until that marginal cost of
control equals the recovery cost of the polluted land.
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Proof. From equations (3.22) and (3.23), we can get the marginal loss caused by land
pollution  2 =  c3er(t T




which shows that the absolute value of marginal cost is increasing according to time
(@|c2a|
@t
> 0), until it equals the recovery cost c3.
In other words, as long as the marginal cost of pollution control is greater than the discounted
land recovery cost, which is c3er(t T
C), the mining firm can pollute one more acre of land.
Once it is more expensive to recover the land, the firm shall keep the pollutant in a fixed
area and pollute no more acres.
With the same cost function for pollution control under Assumption 1, we have the
marginal cost of pollution control @c2
@a





   1 , which shows a decreasing trend of land pollution as time increases
(@a(t)
@t
< 0). This is because the recovery cost is discounting according to time for the polluted
land. The earlier the land is polluted, the less of the present value of the recovery cost the
firm has to pay. Thus, the firm will pollute more acres of land at the earlier period of
extraction.
From the policy regime that requires the firm to pay damage only, we know that the firm
invests more in pollution control and pollutes fewer acres of land at the early period of the
extraction. Di↵ering from that strategy, if only the land recovery cost is internalized, the
firm will invest less and pollute more acres of land at the early period due to the discounting
e↵ects of the recovery cost.
3.1.3.2 The extraction path
For the extraction path under the policy of internalizing the land recovery cost, similar
to the Proposition 4, we have:
Proposition 6. When the policy requires the land recovery cost to be internalized, the life
of the mine is shorter than the case with no environmental regulations.
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Proof. From equations (3.18), (3.23) and (3.24), we can get  q(TC)2 =  a(TC)  +c3a(TC) 
rc3A(TC). Compare with the terminal condition  q(T o)2 ⇡ 0 in absence of the reg-
ulation, we have q(TC) > q(T o). By the constraint
´
T
0 q(t) = R0 and equations
(3.19) and (3.21), we have p ↵  2  (T
C   1
r
(1   e rTC )) = R0   q(T
C)
r





(1   e rT o)) = R0. Since q(T
C)
r
(1   e rTC ) > 0, we know that the right






can prove that under the policy of internalizing the recovery cost, the extraction time
TC is shorter than the time with no regulations, TC < T o.
For one acre of land that is polluted, the firm has to pay the recovery cost after the mining.
On the one hand, if the firm delays the extraction for a longer period of time, the present
value of the recovery cost will be smaller. Thus, the firm can get benefits from the delay. On
the other hand, the firm has to invest in pollution control at each period. If the extraction
time is longer and the recovery process is delayed, the sum of the pollution control costs will
be larger. Therefore, the firm also has incentives to extract the mineral in a shorter period
of time.
There may be one extreme condition that at the terminal time, q(TC) also approaches
zero. From the equation  q(TC)2 =  a(TC)   + c3a(TC)  rc3A(TC), we can see that when
the discount rate r is extremely high, it is possible for the equation to equal zero. In this
situation, the firm that has to pay the future recovery cost will delay the extraction for a
long period, just as that with no regulations. This is also reasonable because under a high
discount rate, the present value of recovery cost will be lower if the extraction time is longer.
As long as the investment in pollution control is smaller than the saved recovery cost, the
firm may find more benefit from delaying the extraction for a longer period.
Under this policy, because of the discount e↵ects, the firm will extract the mineral a
little slower than the above two policy regimes, all the other things being equal. By delaying
the extraction path, the firm can avoid the future recovery cost coming too soon. As such,
20If the mineral is not physically depleted under the environmental policy, the right hand side of the previous
equation is even much smaller than R0.
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under the policy of internalizing the recovery cost, there is a higher probability that the firm
will physically deplete the mine than in the cases under other regulations. In addition, the
discount e↵ects is so important that the firm may intentionally report a longer period than
the real operation time to delay the recovery process.
From the above analysis, theoretically it is shown that under environmental regulations,
the mining firm will invest in pollution control and change the extraction path according
to di↵erent regulations. In the following, some data are assumed to simulate the di↵erent
results of the three policy regimes.
3.2 Numerical simulation
In this section, the models in Section 3.1 are numerically analyzed and the results of
di↵erent policies are compared qualitatively. For our basic data assumption, the parameters
in the model are assumed as follows: r = 0.05, p = 30, R = 20, c1 = 0.8q + 5q2, c2 =
2a 0.5+5q, c3 = 100, D = 10. Since this is a qualitative analysis, the units for the parameters
are not specified. It is assumed there are four identical mining firms governed by di↵erent
rules: Firm 1 is required to pay the pollution damage during the extraction period; Firm 2
has to recover the polluted land after the extraction activity; Firm 3 is required to pay both
the damage and the land recovery cost; and Firm 4 has no environmental liabilities. In the
following, the pollution and extraction strategies and the profits of the firms under the basic
data assumption are compared. Then a sensitivity analysis is conducted.
3.2.1 The pollution path and state
Figure 3.1 (a) and (b) show the pollution paths and states of firms 1, 2, 3. Because Firm
4 has no liability to the polluted land, the pollution acres are too large to be plotted in the
same figure under our basic data assumption. The pollution paths and states of Firms 1, 2
and 3 are analyzed in the following.
From Figure 3.1(a), it can be seen that with the liability of paying pollution damage dur-
ing the extraction period, the pollution path of Firm 1 increases slowly at the beginning but
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(a) The pollution paths (b) The pollution states
Figure 3.1: The pollution paths and states under di↵erent policies
sharply at the end period. This is because after the extraction activity, Firm 1 can run away
from the environmental liabilities. As the terminal time is coming near, the accumulating
damage is smaller per acre of polluted land and thus Firm 1 pollutes significantly more acres
of land at the end period.
Di↵erent from Firm 1, Firm 2 has a decreasing pollution path under the liability of
recovering the polluted land. Since the recovery happens after the extraction activity, the
earlier the land is polluted, the smaller the current value of the recovery cost. Considering
the discount e↵ects, Firm 2 has incentives to pollute more acres at the beginning but pollute
fewer acres of land when the recovery cost is coming soon.
With liabilities of paying both the damage and the recovery cost, Firm 3 has to consider
both the accumulating damage and the discount e↵ects on the recovery cost. Under the
assumption of our basic data, the pollution path of Firm 3 increases slowly. This is consistent




land pollution shows an increasing trend as time increases.
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Figure 3.1(b) shows the land pollution states A(t) of firms 1, 2 and 3. Under the basic
data assumptions, Firm 1 has the largest polluted land. Firm 3 will always pollute the
least acres of land within the four firms because of its liabilities in both of the damage and
recovery cost.
Figure 3.1 (a) and (b) show that the numerical results about the pollution paths are
consistent with the theoretical analysis in Section 3.1.
3.2.2 The extraction path and state
The following Figure 3.2 (a) and (b), respectively, shows the extraction paths and the
reserve states of all the four firms. Clearly, Firm 4, which has no environmental liabilities,
has the longest extraction time under our basic data assumption. Figure 3.2 (a) and (b)
confirm the propositions about the extraction paths that under any of the environmental
regulation, the mine will be depleted, either economically or physically, in a shorter period of
time and thus the life of the mine is shorter. Even though under the basic data assumption,
Firm 1 acts more aggressively than Firm 2, the path may change according to the relative
sizes of the damage and the recovery cost, as well as the discount rate.
(a) The extraction paths (b) The reserve states
Figure 3.2: The extraction paths and reserve states under di↵erent policies
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The mineral reserve state in Figure 3.2 (b) also shows that if the firm has liabilities for
either environmental damage or recovery cost or both of them, the firm’s extraction period
is shorter than that of no environmental regulations.
3.2.3 The profit path
Figure 3.3 (a) shows the profits of all the firms at each period. Firm 4 has the highest
profit since none of the externalities is internalized. Because Firm 3 has more liabilities
than any other firm, Firm 3 will always have the lowest profit. However, all the social losses
are internalized by Firm 3. If the externalities that are not internalized by other firms are
considered, Firm 3 will create the greatest social benefit as shown in Figure 3.3 (b).
(a) The mining firm’s profit paths (b) The social benefits
Figure 3.3: The profit paths and social benefits under di↵erent policies
Figure 3.3 (b) shows a comparison of the social benefit, which equals the mining firm’s
profit minus the externalities that are not internalized by the firm. That is, for Firm 1, which
pays the pollution damage only, the social benefit equals Firm 1’s profit minus the recovery
cost, which is required for reclaiming the polluted land but is not paid by Firm 1. For Firm
2, the social benefit equals Firm 2’s profit minus the accumulated pollution damage that is
not paid at each period. However, for Firm 4 with no environmental liabilities, the polluted
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land areas are so large that the social losses from both the land damage and the recovery
cost are too great to be o↵set by the firm’s profit. Figure 3.3 (b) does not plot the social
benefits under no environmental policies because they are great negative numbers under the
basic data assumption.
As shown in Figure 3.3 (b), Firm 3, which internalizes both of the pollution damage and
the land recovery cost, creates more social benefits than the other firms.
3.2.4 Sensitivity analysis
From the theoretical analysis, it has been shown that the pollution strategy and extraction
path may be a↵ected by the relative sizes of the pollution damage and the recovery cost, as
well as the discount rate. In the following, the cases with relatively greater pollution damage
and a higher discount rate are analyzed.
3.2.4.1 Greater pollution damage
This section assumes the pollution damage D = 30, with all the other data equal to those
in our basic assumption. The following land pollution state in Figure 3.4 shows that in total
Firm 1 pollutes fewer acres of land than Firm 2. This is because the pollution damage is
relatively great so that Firm 1 has to pollute less even though it has no future land recovery
liability.
The mineral extraction path in Figure 3.5 shows that Firm 1 extracts the mineral more
aggressively with greater pollution damage. The extraction path of Firm 1 is almost the same
as Firm 3. Under the policy of internalizing both the pollution damage and the recovery cost,
Firm 3 has to consider two di↵erent e↵ects caused by the externalities. If the accumulated
damage D(1   1
r
)er(t T ) + D
r
is larger, it may have greater e↵ects on the extraction path
of Firm 3 than the discounted recovery cost c3er(t T ). As such, Firm 3 may have a similar
extraction path to Firm 1 as shown in Figure 3.5.
For policy design, especially for the cases where the firm can declare bankruptcy, the
relative size of pollution damage and recovery cost should be considered. If the pollution
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Figure 3.4: The pollution states with greater pollution damage
Figure 3.5: The mineral extraction path with greater pollution damage
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damage is relatively large, as shown above, the social planner may require the mining firm
to internalize the damage rather than the recovery cost in order to reduce the total polluted
land and the social loss.
3.2.4.2 Higher discount rate
Now assume the discount rate is r = 0.1, with all the other data equal to those in the
basic data assumption. Figure 3.6 shows that at a higher discount rate, Firm 2, which has
to pay the recovery cost, has a steeper downward pollution path. This is because the higher
the discount rate, the lower the current value of the recovery cost and the more benefit to
pollute more in the early period for Firm 2.
The pollution path for Firm 3 in Figure 3.6 decreases slowly at the discount rate r = 0.1,




 D, land pollution has a decreasing path. At a higher discount rate, the discounted
recovery cost at each period has more significant e↵ects than the lifelong time accumulated
damage. Thus, Firm 3 pollutes more in the beginning period and has a decreasing pollution
path with a higher discount rate.
Figure 3.6: The pollution paths with higher discount rate
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Compared with Figure 3.2(a), Figure 3.7 shows that, if the discount rate is higher, the
extraction paths of all the firms are steeper because the future value is discounted more.
Firm 1 and Firm 4 extract in a shorter period of time at a higher discount rate. However,
for Firm 2 and Firm 3, the higher discount rate also means smaller current value of the land
recovery cost. Firms 2 and 3 may extend the extraction period in order to reduce the current
value of the recovery cost. Therefore, the firm that has to pay the future recovery cost may
get a benefit by reporting a longer time than its real extraction period in order to postpone
its duty on land recovery.
Figure 3.7: The extraction paths with higher discount rate
For policy design, the discount e↵ects also should be considered since the extraction
activity often lasts several years. At a high discount rate, it may be better to require the
firm to pay the pollution damage rather than the recovery cost. This is because the discount
e↵ects may cause the firm to postpone the land recovery process intentionally.
3.3 Conclusion
For the environmental problems with stock externalities, the strategies of “wait and see”,
“pollute first, eliminate later”, etc., are adopted to avoid capital investment in the current
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period. Some economists analyze the natural decay rate for stock pollution control. However,
in the real world, the natural decay rates of some pollutants are very slow while the problems
caused by the stock pollution are urgencies. For example, heavy metals have polluted large
acres of traditional farmland in China where millions of tons of contaminated grains are
produced every year. The potential social risk is so huge that capital investment in abating
the stock pollutants should be considered.
This paper considers stock pollution to be reversible with capital investment. By a
simple natural resource extraction model with externalities of heavy metal pollution in the
surrounding farmland, three policy regimes for the reversible stock pollution control have
been considered. Under these policy regimes, tradeo↵s are made between investing in pol-
lution control now and paying the current pollution damage and/or stock abatement cost
in the future. The firm has to invest a cost of pollution control to contain the pollutant in
certain areas at each period. It has been shown that if the marginal cost of pollution control
is higher than the externality cost, then more acres of farmland will be polluted. Other-
wise, the pollution is contained in a fixed area. Compared with the extraction path with
no regulations, the firm may extract the mineral more quickly and deplete the mine (either
economically or physically) in a shorter period of time under environmental liabilities. As
such, the life of the mine is shorter under environmental policies.
Qualitative simulation of the model confirms the theoretical analysis and shows that, if
both the pollution damage and land recovery cost are internalized, the firm will create the
greatest social benefit. The pollution and extraction paths under di↵erent regulations are
sensitive to the internalized costs and the discount rate. If the pollution damage is relatively
great, the firm that has to pay the damage may pollute fewer acres of land and extract the
mineral more quickly than the firm that has to pay the recovery cost. At a high discount
rate, under the regime of internalizing the recovery cost, the firm has incentives to postpone
its duty on land recovery by reporting a longer time than its real extraction period. If the
pollution damage is relatively great or the discount rate is high, it may be better to require
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the firm to pay the current period damage rather than future recovery cost. The social
planner may consider the relative sizes of the pollution damage and land recovery cost as
well as the discount rate to develop suitable policy regimes for the real world problems.
Even though this thesis uses a simple model of mineral extraction with externalities of
land pollution, the results can also be used in other reversible stock pollution situations. For
example, the CO2 stock in the atmosphere could be abated by capital investment except for
the natural decay process. Since both the carbon flow and stock are large, the social planner
may calculate a firm’s lifelong time emissions of CO2 and require the firm to pay the lifelong
time damage as well as the cost for abating the same amount of CO2 in the future.
3.4 References Cited
[1] Sungmin Hong, Jean-Pierre Candelone, Clair C. Patterson, and Claude F. Boutron.
Greenland ice evidence of hemispheric lead pollution two millennia ago by greek and
roman civilizations. Science, 265(5180):1841–1843, 23 September 1995.
[2] Soil Quality Institute. Soil quality-urban technical note no.3. Technical report, United
States Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service, September
2000.
[3] USGS. Mercury in the environment. http://www.usgs.gov/themes/factsheet/146-00/,
October 2000.
[4] Ping Guan. The 12th first five-year plan to reduce heavy metal pollution.
http://www.dfdaily.com/html/113/2011/2/22/570602.shtml, Feb 22 2011.
[5] Brian Owens. China vows to curb heavy-metal pollution, Feb 23 2011. URL http:
//blogs.nature.com/news/2011/02/china_vows_to_curb_heavymetal.html.
[6] Susmita Dasgupta, Benoit Laplante, Hua Wang, and David Wheeler. Confronting the
environmental kuznets curve. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1):147–168, 2002.
[7] Simon Kuznets. Economic growth and income inequality. The American Economic
Review, XLV(one), March 1955.
[8] Gene M. Grossman and Alan B.Krueger. Economic growth and the environment. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(2):353–337, May 1995.
51
[9] Arik Levinson. Environmental kuznets curve. In Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E.
Blume, editors, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd
edition, 2008.
[10] Michael Hoel and Larry Karp. Taxes versus quotas for a stock pollutant. Resource and
Energy Economics, 24:367–384, 2002.
[11] Richard G. Newell and William A. Pizer. Regulating stock externalities under uncer-
tainty. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 45:416–432, 2003.
[12] Emmett Keeler, Michael Spence, and Richard Zeckhauser. The optimal control of pul-
lution. Journal of Economic Theory, (4):19–34, 1971.
[13] Bruce A. Forster. Optimal pollution control with a nonconstant exponential rate of
decay. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, (2):1–6, 1975.
[14] Michael A. Toman and Cees Withagen. Accumulative pollution, ”clean technology”,
and policy design. Resouce and Energy Economics, (22):367–384, 2000.
[15] Morgane Cheve. Irreversibility of pollution accumulation new implications for sustain-
able endogenous growth. Environmental and Resource Economics, (16):93–104, 2000.
[16] Y.H. Farzin. Optimal pricing of environmental and natural resource use with stock
externalities. Journal of Public Economics, (62):31–57, 1996.
[17] EPA. Cleaning up the nation’s hazardous wastes sites. http://www.epa.gov/superfund/,
June 2013.
[18] SMCRA. Surface mining control and reclamation act of 1977, 1977.




SHOULD ENVIRONMENTAL BONDS COVER THE WORST-CASE SCENARIO?
According to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) of 1977, a
surface mining firm has to post a bond to ensure the land is reclaimed after mining activities.
The bond may be forfeited if the firm does not reclaim the mining point as required [1]. For
the oil and gas industry, the United States Code of Federal Regulations(CFR), 43 CFR 3104.1
requires a minimum bond prior to any drilling or surface disturbance activities [2]. Previous
literature has analyzed the advantages of the bonding requirements. Specifically, Costanza
and Perrings [3] and Perrings [4] recommend that bonds have flexibility and e ciency in
controlling pollution that has potential future e↵ects. Shogren et al. [5] and Gerard [6]
show some empirical success of environmental bonds used for promoting reclamation. The
assurance bonding system has also been recommended as an instrument for many problems
with uncertain risks. For example, some literature suggests that bonds can be used for the
risk of labor shirking, future risk of genetically modified crops, water quality problems, and
carbon capture and storage.21
Even though bonds have been promoted with advantages to cover unanticipated future
liabilities, the bond amounts are not easy to determine. Some literature recommends the
bond amounts be set with the largest guarantee for reclamation and cover the worst-case
scenario. Costanza and Perrings [3] suggest that the bonds should be “equal to the current
best estimate of the largest potential future environmental damages” (cover the worst-case
cost). They consider that an annually adjusted bond based on new information is more
e cient. The SMCRA requires that a bond must be adequate to cover the cost of reclamation
and is determined by the “worst case method”. However, in contrast to the worst case
scenario, Gerard [6] suggests that a bond level lower than the expected reclamation cost can
21See, for example, Lin [7], Costanza and Perrings [3], Mooney and Gerard [8], Gerard and Wilson [9].
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also induce firms to reclaim the sites because the firms may consider potential legal expenses
and the reputation costs. In addition, bonds with large values may have limitations. Shogren
et al. [5] consider that large bonds have liquidity constraints and may pose significant barriers
for firms entering into market. The authors also analyze the incentives of firms to challenge
the losses of their bonds by legal battles. They show that surprisingly high litigation costs
may reduce the e ciency of the environmental bond. We may conjecture that the larger
value of the bond, the stronger the incentives of a firm to fight a legal war.
In real world cases, the bond amount charged by the government is often less than
the actual reclamation cost. Some literature and reports have emphasized the insu cient
problem of the bond amount. For example, according to Shogren et al. [5], for the acreage
claimed in coal mining by Pennsylvania, “the average reclamation cost per acre has been
about $6,700, while the average bond amount per acre has been about $730”. The bond
amounts are so small that the firms have incentives to abandon the bonds and shirk their
duty of reclamation. Davis [10] shows that the minimum bond amount set by the United
States Code of Federal Regulations in 1960, which is never updated for inflation, is too low to
cover reclamation expenses. Andersen et al. [11] provide examples of the variances between
reclamation costs and the bond amounts for oil and gas fields in Wyoming. According to
their data from 255 orphaned wells, the actual cost of the full reclamation was approximately
$27,555 per well but the bond per well was $5,302.22 The authors believe that the biggest
weakness of the current bonding requirements is that they are not tied to production. The
review of “Performance Bond Adequacy” of Kentucky [12] shows that 49 bonds were forfeited
between January 1, 2007 and May 1, 2010. While 39 of them were examined, only 7 had
su cient bond amount to complete reclamation while the remaining 32 (82 percent) were
insu cient.
Despite the law requirement and literature suggestions for the bond amount, the govern-
ment has yet to require a large bond amount. One of the concerns may be the local economic
22The full sample includes some wells with no bond posted.
54
prosperity in the current period. If the bond amount is too much in an administrative region,
fewer firms might become involved in operations in that jurisdiction, considering the liquidity
and other uncertain risks. For example, according to Kentucky state o cials, some small,
independent coal mine operators are unable or unwilling to secure surety bonds because of
substantial collateral [13].23 For the local government, there would be a royalty income loss
if the firm entrance is discouraged by a high bond rate. However, if the bond amount is
too small, firms would have incentives to shirk their e↵orts of cleaning up. The government
would also have a loss because the forfeited bond amount might be insu cient to cover the
actual reclamation cost. Provided the above concerns, how should a local government choose
the bond amount to maximize fiscal revenue?
This thesis considers a revenue-maximizing local government that makes tradeo↵s be-
tween charging a large amount of bond and losing some royalty income. On the one hand,
the greater bonds would encourage the e↵orts of firms to do cleanups and leave less en-
vironmental damage. If the bond charged is great enough to cover the worst-case cost of
reclamation, as suggested by some literature, a government would get benefit from the bond
requirement since there would be little unfunded damage left for the government to pay. On
the other hand, the larger bonds may serve as operational disincentives for firms and reduce
royalty incomes of a local government. Thus, the optimal amount of bond should be able to
balance the benefit from environmental protection e↵orts with the cost from royalty loss for
a local government. Based on this benefit and cost analysis of bonding requirements, this
thesis proposes a model to maximize the government revenue for selecting the optimal bond
rate.
It is shown that the bond does not necessarily cover the worst-case scenario for a local
government which is concerned with both environmental protection and the local economic
prosperity. This thesis suggests that the bond be charged as a percentage of the firm’s revenue
to tie the bond amount to production and inflation. The optimal bond rate is correlated
23An alternative bonding system, “bond pool” that requires less initial expenses has been recommended to
cover these small operators [13].
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with the firm entrance and duty shirking elasticities. This revenue-maximizing method for
bond calculation supplies a method for a local government to consider the optimal bond
amount and make appropriate tradeo↵s.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section 4.1, a model for a local government
to maximize its fiscal revenue is developed. In Section 4.2, it is shown that the optimal bond
rate charged by the government shall be changed according to the firm entrance and duty
shirking elasticities. Comparative statics are then taken to show that the optimal bond
rate can also be a↵ected by other factors, including a government’s royalty rate, the actual
reclamation cost and the firm’s revenue. In Section 4.3, the applications and limitations of
the model are discussed. Conclusions are given in Section 4.4.
4.1 Model
Suppose a local government in an administrative region is concerned with the economic
prosperity and would like to charge a bond at a reasonable level to maximize its fiscal
revenue. Let the bond amount equal ↵ percent (0  ↵ < 1) of the firm’s revenue pq (price
times quantity of production) and all the royalties equal   percent (0 <   < 1) of pq. The
bond requirement may discourage local economic activities. The following assumptions are
considered.
Assumption 1: The number of firms operating in the administrative region is N̄ if there
is no bond requirement. With an ↵ percent of bond, the number of firms will reduce
to N(↵), where 0  N(↵)  N̄ and @N(↵)
@↵
 0.
Assumption 1 shows that, as the bond rate increases, some firms would leave that adminis-
trative region and N(↵) decreases. In one extreme case, the bond rate may have no e↵ect on
the number of firms. In this case, @N(↵)
@↵
= 0 and N(↵) would equal N̄ at any ↵. In another
case, the bond rate may have significant e↵ects on N(↵) and N(↵) may be zero with any
positive ↵.
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Assumption 2: The probability that firms will shirk the duty of reclamation is f(↵), where
0  f(↵)  1 and @f(↵)
@↵
< 0. If the bond is equal to or higher than the real reclamation
cost, no firms will shirk the duty and f(↵) = 0. If there is no bond requirement
(↵ = 0), f(↵) approaches 1.24
The probability of shirking is a complex function that may be a↵ected by several reasons.
This thesis simplifies the analysis and considers the bond rate ↵ as the main factor. Under
Assumption 2, the higher the bond rate, the lower likelihood of the firm to shirk the duty
and abandon the bond.
If a firm shirks the duty of cleaning up, the government would then forfeit the bond
and do the reclamation. Thus f(↵) is also the probability of the bond being forfeited. The
government would
Maximize  pqN(↵) + f(↵)N(↵)↵pq   f(↵)N(↵)C (4.1)
In equation (4.1),  pqN(↵) represents the royalty income. f(↵)N(↵)↵pq is the income
from forfeited bond. The variable C represents the real environment reclamation cost and
f(↵)N(↵)C is the cost that the government has to pay for reclamation that is shirked by
firms. Set the recovery cost rate ✓ = C
pq
, then the revenue function would be
R = pq[ N(↵) + f(↵)N(↵)(↵  ✓)] (4.2)












)(↵  ✓)] = 0 (4.3)
Equation (4.3) shows that the bond rate ↵ may a↵ect the government revenue by several





< 0) shows that a lower bond rate may attract more firms and increase
the royalty income of the local government. Second, ↵ has a negative e↵ect on f(↵), the
percentage of firms that shirks the duty of cleaning up. @f
@↵
N(↵) < 0 shows that a lower
24This thesis assumes there are reputation costs that the firms who want to stay in the same business may
consider. Since in real world situations, when the bond is lower than the real reclamation cost, not all
firms shirk the duty of reclamation. See Gerard [6]for the literature considers reputation cost.
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bond rate will incentivize a higher percentage as well as a larger number of firms to shirk
the duty, and thus decrease the government revenue. Third, ↵  ✓ (with ↵ < ✓) in equation
(4.3) shows that a lower ↵ will generate a larger deficit of reclamation cost and diminish the
government revenue.






















)(↵  ✓)] = 0 (4.4)
The first part  ✏
N
in equation (4.4) indicates that a higher elasticity of firm entrance ✏
N





✓) shows that a lower ↵ would diminish the government revenue by increasing both the
probability of duty shirking and the deficit of reclamation cost. It also shows that higher
elasticities of firm entrance and duty shirking would decrease the marginal revenue.














It should be noted that equation (4.5) is an implicit function with f(↵) as a function of
↵. To find the maximum of the government revenue and the optimal bond rate, the cases
where the elasticities are in di↵erent ranges are analyzed in the following.
4.2 The bond rate under di↵erent cases




, the duty shirking probability f(↵), the royalty rate   and the real reclamation cost
rate ✓ by maximizing the local government’s revenue. In this section, how the optimal bond
rate may be a↵ected by these factors under di↵erent cases is considered.
25From @N(↵)@↵  0 in Assumption 1 and
@f(↵)
@↵ < 0 in Assumption 2, we know that ✏N is either zero or
negative and ✏f is negative.
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4.2.1 Two extreme cases
In the real world, the actual reclamation cost may be a very small percent of the firm’s
revenue and thus a corresponding bond amount may not scare away any firms. In this case,
the elasticity of firm entrance with respect to the bond rate could be zero, ✏
N
= 0. In other
words, the firm entrance is perfectly inelastic to the bond rate. In another extreme case, the
firms may be very sensitive to the bond rate. A small amount of bond may pose a barrier
for all firms to enter the market. The firm entrance would be perfectly elastic to the bond
rate and the elasticity is negative infinity, ✏
N
=  1. The two extreme cases are considered
in the following.
4.2.1.1 Perfect inelasticity of firm entrance
When the firm entrance with respect to the bond rate is perfectly inelastic, the elasticity
✏
N
= 0. That is, the number of firms operating in an administrative region is not a↵ected
by the bond rate at all. In this case, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1. If the firm entrance is perfectly inelastic with respect to the bond rate, the
government should charge a bond equal to or higher than the real reclamation cost.
Proof: At ✏
N
= 0, the number of firms will not change according to ↵ and thus N(↵) = N̄ .
From equation (4.5), we have ↵⇤ = ✏f ✓1+✏
f





< 0, we know ↵⇤   ✓.
Under Assumption 2, when a bond is charged higher than or equal to the real recovery
cost, we have f(↵) = 0. So the government revenue is maximized at R =  pqN̄ with
any ↵ that satisfies ↵   ✓.
Proposition 1 shows that if a local government believes that the bonding requirement will
not deter any firms from operations, the government can charge a bond amount as large as
possible to thoroughly cover the future reclamation cost. At any ↵   ✓, it should be noted
that the government revenue will not increase as ↵ increases because the bond has to be
returned back to the firms after they clean up.
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4.2.1.2 Perfect elasticity of firm entrance
If the firm entrance is perfectly elastic to the bond rate, the elasticity is negative infinity,
✏
N
=  1. This shows that as long as the bond rate is positive, all the firms will leave the
administrative region. In this case, we have the following Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. If the firm entrance is perfectly elastic with respect to the bond rate, the
government should not charge a bond as long as the royalty income is high enough to
cover the reclamation cost.
Proof: At ✏
N
=  1, the number of firms is very sensitive to the bond rate and N(↵) = 0 at
any ↵ > 0. The government royalty income will be zero with the bonding requirement.
If the government does not charge a bond (↵ = 0), the revenue will be R = (  ✓)pqN̄ .
As long as   > ✓, the royalty income can cover the reclamation cost and thus the
government revenue will be positive and maximized.
In real world situations, it may be hard to find a case where a bonding requirement scares
away all firms. However, there are many cases in which local governments do not charge
bonds. Clearly, with no bonding requirement, a local government should ensure that the
royalty income is at least high enough to cover the future reclamation cost.
However, there are some empirical cases where the government revenue cannot cover the
large environmental cost. In some areas of developing countries, a local government may
only focus on the current period development but ignore the environmental damages and
bonding requirements. For example, in one rare earth mining location named Ganzhou in
China, the cleanup cost of the mining pollution is estimated to be more than 38 billion
yuan ($5.8 billion) while the local government revenue from the rare earth mining over years
are much lower than that cost [14, 15]. The short-view policies of the local government
leave huge social costs and unfunded liabilities for taxpayers. The local government should
consider the bonding requirement and pay much more attention to the balance of royalty
income and the cost of cleanup when authorizing mining activities.
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In the above two extreme cases, the bond rate should be required either at a high level
that completely covers the real reclamation cost or at a low amount equal to zero. There are
other cases where a bond may be charged at a normal level. In the following, the elasticity
of firm entrance ✏
N
is assumed to be moderate (neither zero nor negative infinity) to analyze
what the optimal bond looks like.
4.2.2 Moderate cases
Except for the two extreme cases, the bond rate may have relatively moderate e↵ects on
the number of firms N(↵) that operate in an administrative region. A high bond rate may
cause some, but not all, firms to relocate to other administrative regions that require a lower
bond rate26 or to quit the mining market. In these cases, we will have the the elasticity of
firm entrance  1 < ✏
N
< 0 and @N(↵)
@↵
< 0 (not equal to zero).
With Assumption 2, at ↵   ✓, there is no firm to shirk the duty of cleaning up and the
probability of bond forfeited is zero, f(↵) = 0. From equation (4.2), the government revenue
would equal R =  pqN(↵) for all ↵   ✓. Because @N(↵)
@↵
< 0, then at ↵ = ✓, the revenue is
maximized, R⇤ = R(✓) =  pqN(✓). However, there may exist some ↵ less than ✓ that can
increase the government revenue to be higher than R(✓).
Proposition 3. The government can achieve a higher fiscal revenue by charging a bond
smaller than the actual reclamation cost.
Proof. When the bond rate ↵ is lower than the actual recovery cost rate ✓ (0 < ↵ < ✓),
with @N(↵)
@↵
< 0, there would be more firms to operate in the administrative region and
thus N(↵) > N(✓). The government revenue is R(↵) = pq[ N(↵)+ f(↵)N(↵)(↵  ✓)].
Comparing with R(✓) =  pqN(✓), there could exist R(↵) > R(✓) with a very small
number of f(↵).
26Similar with relocation of the firms to areas with more relaxed environmental policies in the carbon leakage
problem.
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Thus, there are some cases where the government can require a bond smaller than the real
recovery cost to maximize its fiscal revenue. By R(↵) > R(✓), the following condition exists:
 [N(↵) N(✓)] >  f(↵)N(↵)(↵  ✓) (4.6)
In the above condition (4.6), the left hand side is the increased royalty income and the
right hand side is the insu cient amount or the deficit to do the reclamation when charging
a smaller bond than the real reclamation cost (↵ < ✓). As long as the increased royalty is
great enough to cover the insu cient bond amount, the government can achieve a higher







From the definition of elasticity, we know that the elasticity of firm entrance ✏
N
with
respect to the bond rate equals the percent change of N(↵) divided by the percent change






For any ↵ < ✓ which satisfies this condition (4.8), the revenue R(↵) will be greater than
R(✓). The condition (4.8) shows that the bond rate should have some noteworthy e↵ects
on N(↵), that is, the elasticity should be su ciently high for a government to consider a





should be charged equal to the real reclamation cost. The reason is that, with a low elasticity
of firm entrance, the e↵ect of the bond rate on firm entrance is small, and the incremental
royalty income from the additional number of firms cannot cover the insu cient amount to
do reclamation shirked by firms.
Thus, there exist some bond rates ↵ which are less than the real reclamation cost ✓ but
can increase the government revenue to be higher than R(✓). One of these rates is the optimal
bond rate ↵⇤ that satisfies equation (4.5) and can maximize the government revenue. In the
following, the conditions under which the optimal bond rate may be charged di↵erently are
analyzed.
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4.2.3 The ranges of the elasticities




under which the optimal
bond rate may change. Suppose the elasticities are constant for all bond rates, the derivative


























<  1 (the duty shirking is elastic), we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4: If the duty shirking is elastic to the bond rate (✏
f
<  1 ), the optimal bond
should be charged smaller than the real reclamation cost (↵⇤ < ✓) when the firm entrance




f(↵⇤)), and equal to the real reclamation cost







<  1, equation (4.9) is positive, @↵⇤
@✏
N












equation (4.5) shows that ↵⇤ > ✓. Under Assumption 2, for any ↵ > ✓, the government
revenue will decrease since N(↵) would be smaller than N(✓) when ✏
N





< 0, the optimal bond should be equal to the the real reclamation cost,
↵⇤ = ✓.
The relationship between the optimal bond rate ↵⇤ and the elasticity of firm entrance may
look like Figure 4.1.
The curve is increasing as ✏
N
increases but it may be either convex or concave or a mix




and the function of f(↵). It should
be noted that the elasticity of firm entrance is negative and as ✏
N
increases, the elasticity is
actually lower.
Figure 4.1 shows, when firm entrance elasticity is high (✏
N
<  1), the firm entrance is
sensitive to the bond amount. The bond cannot be charged at a high rate. In one extreme
case, if the firm entrance is perfectly elastic with respect to the bond rate, as shown in
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Figure 4.1: The firm entrance elasticity and the optimal bond rate
Figure 4.1 when ✏
N
goes to  1, the local government should not charge a bond and ↵
approaches zero.
However, when the elasticity is low (✏
N
>  1), the firm entrance is not sensitive to the
bond rate. The bond can be charged at a large amount but still could be less than the





optimal bond rate will be equal to the real recovery cost rate ✓, as shown by the dot line
in Figure 4.1. In the extreme case, if the firm entrance is perfectly inelastic (✏
N
= 0), then
theoretically the bond rate could be charged as high as possible. As the analysis in Section
4.2.1, the bond rate ↵ can be any amount that satisfies ↵   ✓ when the firm entrance is
unrelated to the bond rate.
If ✏
f









>  1, both the firm entrance
and duty shirking are inelastic to the bond rate. In this case, it is hard to find an ↵ that
is smaller than ✓ but can still generate a revenue higher than R(✓). Thus, if both the firm
entrance and duty shirking are insensitive to the bond rate, the optimal bond rate may be
simply charged equal to the real reclamation cost.
In the above, the conditions of the elasticities under which the optimal bond rate should
be charged di↵erently have been analyzed. In the following, comparative statics is used to
study the changes of ↵⇤ with respect to the exogenous parameters. Since the optimal bond
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In this section, comparative statics is used to see the changes of ↵⇤ with respect to the
royalty rate   and the real reclamation cost rate ✓, which equals the reclamation cost C
divided by the firm’s revenue pq. From equation (4.5), the derivatives of ↵⇤ with respect to
  and ✓ are taken to see how the optimal bond rate may change according to the rates of
royalty and reclamation cost.
































From the comparative statics, we have the following proposition.




<  1, a local government with a higher royalty
rate   would prefer to charge a lower bond rate, while a greater real reclamation cost





<  1, from equation (4.10) we have @↵⇤
@ 
< 0 . This shows that as the




> 0. Since the real reclamation cost ✓ = C
pq
, we have @↵
⇤
@C
> 0 and @↵
⇤
@(pq) < 0.
These suggest that if the real reclamation cost is greater or the firm’s revenue is smaller,
the bond should be charged at a higher rate.
The condition (4.6) shows that, as   is higher, the increased royalty from the additional
number of firms would be larger and thus the government would have more financial resources
to cover the insu cient bond amount. As long as the beneficial e↵ects from increased
royalties are greater than the harmful ones from the insu cient bond, a lower bond rate
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would be reasonable. We can conjecture that the states with high royalty rates would want
to charge smaller bonds than states with low royalty rates.
The condition @↵
⇤
@(pq) < 0 shows that as the firm’s revenue is decreasing, a local government
should increase the bond rate to a higher level. It should be noted that a higher bond rate
does not necessarily mean a larger bond amount because the bond rate ↵ is a percentage of




> 0 shows that the higher reclamation cost would require a higher
bond rate. This is reasonable because a higher bond rate would call more attention to the
need for protecting the fragile environment in some mining areas.
4.3 Discussion
Andersen et al. [11] suggest that the bond amounts should be linked with production
and the depth of wells in the oil and gas industry. In the proposal by Davis [10], the federal
minimum bond amount per lease is recommended to be increased for inflation. In this paper,
it is recommended that the bond be charged as a percentage of the mining firm’s revenue,
rather than as a fixed amount per lease or per acre of land. A percentage bond requirement
can not only link the bond amount to the production but also to the inflation. For many
mining activities, the potential environment disturbance is often correlated with the size of
the mine. If the bond is charged as a percentage of the firm’s revenue, the bond amount
would depend on output and would be di↵erent from site to site. Compared to the existing
lump-sum bond that is required before mining activities, the percentage bond is a di↵erent
mechanism. It can be charged annually according to new information. Furthermore, for
small sized firms, a percentage bond may have less liquidity constraint at the initial period
than a lump-sum bond.
The model in this thesis is simplified by several assumptions. First, similar to the method
by Ballard et al. [16], this analysis is simplified by using given elasticities for all bond rates.
The elasticities of firm entrance and duty shirking may change if the bond rate changes.
Second, it is assumed that the royalty rate   is given. Actually, the royalty rate could be
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a choice variable that has e↵ects on the number of firms that operate in an administrative
region. Therefore, a high royalty rate may decrease the government revenue by scaring firms
away. Third, this analysis assumes the reclamation cost as a percentage of the firm’s revenue
is known. In real world cases, the future recovery cost is often di cult to be calculated.
If there are plenty of historical experiences, a relatively accurate reclamation cost can be
estimated. However, as Davis [10] shows, the empirical evidence is limited because drilling
techniques are evolving rapidly. An approximate percentage estimation of the reclamation
cost is necessary to determine the optimal bond rate. In addition, the recovery cost could
also be a choice variable since the reclamation levels could be various. As Shogren et al. [5]
recommend, the valuation of potential environmental damages must be well understood to
determine the bond level. One interesting question may be, given the royalty rate   and
the bond rate ↵, how should the government choose an optimal recovery level? Fourth, for
simplification, this thesis uses a static model. Future research may consider a dynamic model
that includes the yearly changes of outputs and reclamation costs to calculate a dynamic
amount of bond.
Since the bond is not a levy but will be returned back to the firms if the required
reclamation is fulfilled, the firm entrance may not be a↵ected too much by the the bond
rate. Thus, the firm entrance may have a low elasticity with respect to the bond rate. If this
is true, a local government can increase the bond rate. However, if empirical analysis shows
a relatively high elasticity of firm entrance, the government may consider loose bonding
requirements.
4.4 Conclusion
Bonding requirements have flexibility and e ciency in covering potential future envi-
ronmental damage. However, the optimal bond amount is di cult to determine, not only
because the potential environmental damages are di cult to estimate, but also because the
impacts of bonding requirements on local economic activities are unknown. A tight bonding
requirement may deter firms from entering the market.
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The literature has emphasized that the reclamation bonds are in inadequate levels. How-
ever, there is neither a standard to determine, nor an economic method to calculate, the
optimal bond amount. Even if the potential environmental damage is known, it is not nec-
essarily optimal to charge an equal bond amount accordingly because the bond impact on
local economic activity is unknown. The firms, especially small and medium-sized firms,
may be concerned that the bond cost is a substantial barrier to entry into the market. They
would prefer a small bond considering the liquidity constraints. Thus, a local government
may take the economic prosperity into account when considering the bonding requirements.
In this paper, based on local government concerns in maximizing its fiscal revenue and
thus the social benefit, the cases where the bond amount may or may not pose a barrier for
firms to entry the market has been analyzed. If a local government believes that a bond has
no impact on the number of firms in the market, the government can require a high amount
of bond to ensure adequate financial resources for future environmental damage. However,
if the bond poses a barrier for market entry, it has been shown that it is not necessarily
unreasonable to charge a smaller amount of bond than the real reclamation cost. That is,
the bond amount does not necessarily cover the worst-case scenario. By requiring a small
bond, the government may encourage more firms to enter the the local market and thus
increase the fiscal revenue from royalties. Truly there may be more firms to shirk the duty
of reclamation under a small bond. The government would have a loss to pay for insu cient
bond amount (the bond account deficit) for the reclamation shirked by firms. However, as
long as the negative e↵ects can be overcome by the increased revenue from royalties, a small
amount of bond is reasonable.
Theoretically, it is shown that the optimal bond rate is correlated with the firm entrance
and duty shirking elasticities. With a relatively low elasticity of firm entrance and a high
elasticity of duty shirking, the bond can be charged at a large amount. However, if the firm
entrance has a relatively high elasticity with respect to the bond rate, that is, if the bonding
requirements discourage firms from entry into the market, a local government should charge
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the bond at a small amount, even smaller than the real reclamation cost to maximize the
fiscal revenue. Comparative statics shows that states with high royalty rates would want to
charge smaller bonds than states with low royalty rates. All the other things equal, a higher
actual reclamation cost or a smaller firm’s revenue indicates a higher bond rate.
Even though some evidence shows that tight bonding requirements deter some small firms
from market [17], there is little research on the e↵ects of the bond amounts on both firm
entrance and duty shirking in an administrative region. The model has been simplified by
assuming that the elasticities of firm entrance and duty shirking are given for all bond rates.
In addition, there are assumptions on fixed royalty rate and reclamation cost in this static
model. Future research may look at empirical data to see the elasticities of firm entrance
and duty shirking, the changes of the royalty rates and reclamation costs. This information
could be used in a dynamic model to estimate either an optimal bond amount charged before
mining activities or a dynamic bond for a local government.
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This thesis has analyzed the problems of making tradeo↵s in environmental protection
and policy design, including the households’ tradeo↵ between consuming environmental
goods and “dirty” goods, the firms’ tradeo↵ between controlling the pollution flow now
and abating the pollution stock in the future, and the government’s tradeo↵ between charg-
ing a large amount of bond and encouraging local economic development. The results are
summarized as follows.
Chapter 2 concerned assigning property rights of environmental goods to households
(also consumers) that are su↵ering from pollution generated by firms. By issuing tradable
permits to these consumers, a market is designed in which consumers will be “suppliers” of
environmental goods and polluters will be “demanders”. In a free market, the selling price,
and the total trading amount of the permits would be determined by the supply curve of
consumers and the demand curve of polluters. Furthermore, the transaction price of permits
would reveal the monetary value of environmental goods. To eliminate the externalities
within the group of consumers, the concept of unitization was extended and a sharing-
benefit mechanism was developed. It has been shown that assigning property rights to
households can yield e cient outcomes under the sharing-benefit mechanism. This provides
a decentralized solution for some cases in which households are more familiar with the
circumstances and make e cient tradeo↵s.
Chapter 3 considered stock pollution to be reversible with capital investment. By a
simple natural resource extraction model with externalities of heavy metal pollution in the
surrounding farmland, three policy regimes were considered. Under these policy regimes,
tradeo↵s are made between investing in control of the pollution flow versus paying the
pollution damage and/or the cleanup cost of the pollution stock in the future. If the marginal
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cost of control of the pollution flow is higher than the externality costs (equal the pollution
damage plus the cleanup cost), more acres of farmland would be polluted. Otherwise, the
pollution would be contained in a fixed area. Compared with the extraction path with no
regulations, the mining firm would exhaust the mine (either economically or physically) in
a shorter period of time under environmental liabilities. As such, the life of the mine would
be shorter under environmental policies.
Chapter 4 analyzed the bonding requirement as an instrument for environmental prob-
lems. Based on local government’s concern in maximizing its fiscal revenue, the optimal
environmental bond has been derived. It was shown that for a local government, it is not
necessarily unreasonable to charge a smaller bond than the real reclamation cost. The op-
timal bond rate is correlated with the firm entrance and duty shirking elasticities. With a
relatively low elasticity of firm entrance and a high elasticity of duty shirking, the bond can
be charged at a large amount. However, if the firm entrance has a relatively high elasticity,
that is, if the bonding requirements discourage firms from entry into the market, a local gov-
ernment should charge the bond at a small amount, even smaller than the real reclamation
cost to maximize the fiscal revenue. Therefore, considering the local economic development,
the optimal bond amount does not necessarily cover the worst-case scenario.
This thesis contributes to environmental policy design by considering interests of di↵erent
parties. By assigning tradable permits to households that are su↵ering pollution generated
by firms under a sharing-benefit mechanism, this thesis provides the first step for designing
a policy of community-based tradable permits. Considering both the current and future
e↵ects of pollution, this thesis contributes to policies of requiring firms to pay the pollution
damage and/or eliminate the pollution stock with capital investment. Under these policies,
the firm’s tradeo↵ between control of the pollution flow versus cleanup of the pollution stock,
and the extraction decisions has been analyzed. This thesis also provides the first step for
deriving the optimal environmental bond based on the concern of a revenue-maximizing local
government.
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